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[W]ork will be judged, however, by the standard set by the
person's previous work, and if it fails to come up to that standard
it will be criticized.
Richard Posner'
Dick is a little remote from the squalor of the real world. He
should visit a prison occasionally.
Norval Morris2

I.

INTRODUCTION: THE POSNERIAN CONTRADICTION

Richard Posner, the Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, has taken law and the legal establishment by
storm. As a newly appointed judge,3 he rapidly churned out well-written
and influential opinions that began to pull this appellate court in what
some regarded as a direction too conservative and too academic.4 Labeled

1. RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO-A STUDY IN REPUTATION 69 (1990) (emphasis omitted).
2. James Warren, Richard Posner Shakes Up the Bench-The Seventh Circuit's Youngest Member Tests His Free Market Theory, AM. LAW., Sept. 1983, at 75, 77 (quoting former University of
Chicago Law School Dean Morris).
3. Posner was appointed to the bench by President Ronald Reagan in 1981. David Ranii, The
Next Nominee?, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 26, 1984, at 1. In his first year on the bench, he authored 90 opinions, "more than any other federal jurist in the country over the same period of time." Id. at 26; accord Warren, supra note 2, at 76.
4. See Paul M. Barrett, Influential Ideas-A Movement Called "Law and Economics" Sways Legal Circles, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1986, at 1; Posner: Admired by Ally and Foe, L.A. L.J., Nov. 25,
1981, at 5; Warren, supra note 2, at 76-77. In some quarters, Posner's ascension to the bench was regularly praised. See, e.g., Gordon Crovitz, Winds of Change on the Bench, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 1985,
at 26.
Although reasonable observers can argue over whether to praise or decry conservatism, there is
little doubt that the Seventh Circuit has more of it since Judge Posner's arrival. See Noreen Marcus,
Rule of Law (and Economics)---Posner and Easterbrook Have Taken the "Chicago School" Onto the
Bench. Together, They've Helped Transform a Circuit, AM. LAW., June 1988, at 38 Supp. In addition
to Posner, President Reagan successfully appointed a number of prominent conservatives to that bench,
including former University of Chicago Law Professor and lawyer-economist Frank Easterbrook, former Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Richard Coffey, and former Warren Burger law clerk and Notre
Dame Law School Professor Kenneth Ripple. Id. at 39; BOB WOODWARD & ScOTr ARMSTRONG, THE
BRETHREN 352-53 (1979). President Reagan also appointed the briefly notorious Daniel Manion, a
South Bend practitioner who faced significant Senate opposition because of his conservatism and
doubts as to his competence. See Stephen J. Adler, Not That Dumb, AM. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 32
(reporting that Manion is now performing well on the Seventh Circuit); Marcus, supra, at 39.
Easterbrook and Ripple joined Posner on the panel that produced the opinion in Troupe v. May Dep't
Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994), which is the focus of this article's criticisms.
As to the issue of the Seventh Circuit's willingness to look beyond theory toward reality, the
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by one reviewer as the law's "most successful agenda entrepreneur since

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,"5 Posner has continued his academic tradition
of prolific publication outside the judicial context with a score of law
review articles6 and several books7 written since ascending to the bench.
Posner's writing has seen both lavish praise and harsh criticism. For
example, reviewers frequently describe him as a towering figure in Ameri-

record is at least mixed. To be sure, many Seventh Circuit opinions during the 1980s and 1990s have
a highly abstract and theoretical quality that some feared might result from the arrival of two Chicago
school economic theorists. Compare American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hospital Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d
589, 593 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) (displaying test for grant of preliminary injunction as a mathematical formula) with Lawson Prods., Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 782 F.2d 1429, 1434-35 (7th Cir. 1986)
(seemingly backing away from Posner's injunction formula). See also Linda S. Mullenix, Burying
(With Kindness) the Felicific Calculus of Civil Procedure,40 VAND. L. REV. 541, 543 (1987) (arguing
that Posner's injunction formula is "an abomination in theory and practice"). During this same time,
however, the Seventh Circuit also has produced some well-reasoned and pragmatic applications of doctrine. See, e.g., Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 713 (7th Cir. 1987) (opinion of Judge
Manion) (holding excessive force in arrest claim is a Fourth Amendment claim, not a substantive due
process claim). The reasoning of Lester was unanimously adopted, without citing the court of appeals,
by the Supreme Court, over the competing approaches of other courts, in'Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 395 (1989). Occasionally, the court is downright bold and penetrating in looking behind the facade of a matter to discern its true content. See, for example, Continental Can Co. v. Chicago Truck
Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Workers Union (Indep.) Pension Fund, 916 F.2d 1154, 1156-59 (7th
Cir. 1990), an opinion written by the normally formal, theoretical, textualist Easterbrook, which characterized floor statements by a U.S. Senator as strategic behavior attempting to create and insert bogus
legislative history. Id. at 1158.
5. William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Social Constructionist Critique of Posner's Sex and Reason:
Steps Toward a Gaylegal Agenda, 102 YALE L.J. 333, 333 (1992) (book review).
6. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Legislation and Its Interpretation:A Primer, 68 NEB. L. REV.
431 (1989) [hereinafter Posner, A Primer]; Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism,Legal Realism, and
the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179 (1987) [hereinafter
Posner, Legal Formalism];Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations,53 U. CI. L. REV. 366 (1986) [hereinafter
Posner, Cautionary Observations]; Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-4nthe Classroom and
in the Courtroom, 50 U. CIn. L. REV. 800 (1983) [hereinafter Posner, Classroom and Courtroom]. By
1983, Posner had authored more than 100 articles and had authored or co-authored ten books. Warren,
supranote 2, at 76. Posner continues to publish in spite of his caseload at the Seventh Circuit.
7. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995) [hereinafter POSNER, OVERCOMING
LAW]; OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONs FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. (Richard A. Posner
ed., 1994) [hereinafter Posner, (ed.), ESSENTIAL HOLMES]; RICHARD A. POSNER, SEx AND REASON
(1992) [hereinafter POSNER, SEX AND REASON]; POSNER, supra note 1; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990) [hereinafter POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE]; RICHARD A. POSNER,
LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988) [hereinafter POSNER, LAw AND LITERATuRE]; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS-CRISIS AND REFORM (1985) [hereinafter
POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS]. Make that eight books, if you count the two most recent editions of his
classic, RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 3d] and RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 4th]. Or ten books, counting works Posner has co-authored. See
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987);
TOMAS J. PHIL-iSON & RICHARD A. POSNER, PRIVATE CHOICES AND PUBLIC HEALTH-THE AIDS
EPIDEMIC IN AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1993).
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can law8 and view Posner's words as important simply because of his
stature.9 Posner also has more than his share of critics. One reviewer explained Posner's productivity with a decidedly negative cast: "[p]art of the
answer, apparently, is that Posner works incessantly and has few outside
interests. The other part of the answer is that Posner's stuff is not that
good.""0 Posner's Sex and Reason" stirred perhaps even more than the
usual Posner post-publication debate, immediately engendering several
reviews in major legal periodicals, including a mini-symposium with a
markedly testy exchange between Posner and four women reviewers. 2
His previous books also were lightning rods for criticism 3 as well as
praise."
Posner's judicial actions also have been criticized, primarily for incon-

8. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Venus in Robes, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 20, 1992, at 36, 36-37
(reviewing POSNER, SEX AND REASON, supra note 7).

9. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Strolling Down the Path of the Law (and Toward CriticalLegal
Studies?): The Jurisprudenceof Richard Posner, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1221, 1222 (1991) (reviewing
POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7).
10. Mark M. Hager, The Emperor's Clothes Are Not Efficient: Posner'sJurisprudenceof Class,
41 AM. U. L. REV. 7, 7 (1991). More recently, a legal columnist who generally praises Posner confirmed that Posner has an insatiable work ethic. See Jeffrey Rosen, Overqualified, NEW REPUBLIC,
Apr. 4, 1994, at 42 (reporting that in addition to his day job as a judge, Posner "works most evenings,
from dinner until midnight").
11. POSNER, SEX AND REASON, supra note 7.
12. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rumpelstiltskin, 25 CONN. L. REV. 473 (1993); Martha A. Fineman,
The Hermeneutics of Reason: A Commentary on Sex and Reason, 25 CONN. L. REV. 503 (1993);
Gillian K. Hadfield, Not the "Radical" Feminist Critique of Sex and Reason, 25 CONN. L. REV. 533
(1993); Ruthann Robson, Posner's Lesbians: Neither Sexy Nor Reasonable, 25 CONN. L. REV. 491
(1993). His response, Richard A. Posner, The Radical Feminist Critique of Sex and Reason, 25 CONN.
L. REV. 515 (1993), characterizes some of the reviewers as left-wing extremists pouncing on him
rather than fairly evaluating his work. Id. at 516. Posner's response is in turn described by one of the
participants as "hyperbolic," see Hadfield, supra, at 536, and "rather defensive," see Fineman, supra,
at 512. Professor Fineman paints a favorable reviewer of Posner as blinded by admiration. Id.
13. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, The Judicial Universe of Judge RichardPosner, 52 U. Cm. L. REV.
1146, 1146, 1161 (1985) (reviewing POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 7) (referring to Posner as
"a captive of a thin and unsatisfactory epistemology"); Stanley Fish, Don't Know Much About the
Middle Ages: Posneron Law and Literature, 97 YALE L.J. 777, 777-78 (1988) (reviewing Richard A.
Posner, Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued, 72 VA. L. REV. 1351 (1988)) (finding Posner's
assumptions oversimplified or inaccurate). See also Hager, supra note 10, at 7 (reviewing POSNER,
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7) (concluding that Posner is often "glib and shallow").
14. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 13, at 1161 (reviewing POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 7)
(generally praising Posner and the book); Stanley Fish, Almost Pragmatism:Richard Posner's Jurisprudence, 57 U. Cm. L. REV. 1447, 1447 (1990) (reviewing POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7)
(calling his own critique a "positive" review); Jason S. Johnston, Not So Cold an Eye: Richard
Posner's Pragmatism, 44 VAND. L. REV. 741, 744 (1991) (reviewing POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra
note 7) (calling it "refreshing"). Ironically, Professors Bator and Fish were also somewhat critical of
Posner. See supra note 13. Other prominent scholars gave basically positive but lukewarm reviews to
Posner's efforts. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Taking BureaucracySeriously, 99 HARV. L. REV. 344,
345 (1985) (reviewing POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 7) (stating that while Posner's economic
analysis is incomplete, he does highlight a crisis of having no theory of adjudication).
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sistently commingling economic analysis with other approaches to
decisionmaking in an effort to reach personally pleasing results that are at
odds with Posner's professed commitment to methodological rigor.'" Although criticism of Posner's judging is diverse,'a common theme is that
he too frequently marshals his argumentative force merely to uphold the
economic rights of the powerful. In other words, according to the critics,
after the rush of intellectual excitement subsides, litigants and the justice
system are left with case results little different from those of the nineteenth century Supreme Court dominated by advocates for commercial
interests. 6
It appears that Posner has through his working life reached certain
predispositions about the world and the characteristics of certain types of
litigation.' In scholarly writings, Posner has suggested more than a little
disaffection with national anti-discrimination policy and with employment
discrimination cases. His misgivings first surfaced in truncated form in his

15. See, e.g., Jennifer G. Brown, Posner, Prisoners, and Pragmatism, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1117,
1123-24, 1176-78 (1992) (finding Posner's market analysis of prisoners' civil rights claims flawed and
his judicial views better explained by use of conservative pragmatism masquerading as economic analysis); George M. Cohen, PosnerianJurisprudenceand Economic Analysis of Law: The View From the
Bench, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1117, 1118 (1985) (arguing that Posner "has applied economic analysis
selectively and incompletely; he has used his unique position as the intellectual force behind the lawand-economics movement to support his conservative political ideology").
16. See Hager, supra note 10, at 7 (Posner's views, although seemingly eclectic, "form a jurisprudence of zealous attack on challenges to private economic power"); Robin P. Malloy, Invisible Hand
or Sleight of Hand? Adam Smith, RichardPosnerand the Philosophy of Law and Economics, 36 KAN.
L. REV. 209, 212 (1988) (comparing Adam Smith's theories of law with Posner's and concluding that
Posner is "not a Smithian" but a "status quo conservative"); Ian Shapiro, RichardPosner'sPraxis, 48
OHIO ST. LJ.999, 1046 (1987) (Posner has "failed to adhere to his ad hoc policy recommendations
for various kinds of judicial restraint." Rather, he "adheres to principles of judicial restraint as and
when it suits him, and he happily violates these to advance his own particular neoclassical conceptions
of the economics of labor and antitrust law" producing "nothing more than thinly veiled ideology to
legitimate the inequities wrought by market systems."). But see Richard A. Posner, On Theory and
Practice: A Reply to "Richard Posner's Praxis," 49 OHto ST. LJ. 1077, 1077 (1989) (replying to
Shapiro, supra).
On the pro-business conservativism of the nineteenth century Supreme Court and the legal
establishment generally, see MORTON J. HoRwIrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMEmCAN LAW 18701960 9-107 (1992) and LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 488-571 (2d ed.
1985).
17. See, e.g., Peter B. Edelman, Mandated Minimum Income, Judge Posner, and the Destruction
of the Rule of Law, 55 ALB. L. REv. 633, 640-41 (1992) (criticizing Posner's legal argument against
mandated minimum income); Gillian K. Hadfield, Flirting with Science: Richard Posner on the
Bioeconomics of Sexual Man, 106 HARV. L. REV. 479, 488-90, 502 (1992) (reviewing POSNER, SEX
AND REASON, supra note 7) (criticizing Posner's assessment of sex roles); Robin West, Authority,
Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and
Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384, 390, 400-01 (1985) (criticizing Posner's assumptions that
consumers always consent to wealth maximizing iransactions, regardless of their perceived morality);
Robin West, Sex, Reason, and a Tastefor the Absurd, 81 GEo. LJ.2413, 2414, 2421-22 (1993) (describing Posner's theories that economic factors drive sexual behavior); accord Malloy, supra note 16,
at 212 (arguing conservative ideological assumptions taint Posner's logic).
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books promoting economic analysis of law. 8 Beginning in 1987, he engaged in a continuing debate with a more liberal scholar over the merits of
Title VII. 9 At a 1988 Symposium commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, he derisively referred to
cases of federal age discrimination litigation as "sacred cows" which
should be among the first to lose federal jurisdiction.2"
Posner's dislike of discrimination law was expressed in more comprehensive academic form with his publication of An Economic Analysis of
Sex DiscriminationLaws,2 in which he concluded that "it is possible that
women as a whole have not benefitted and have in fact suffered" from
laws against gender discrimination22 and that the "price tag" carried by
such laws "might be thought too high by society."' He essentially reiterated these views in the most recent edition of his text, Economic Analysis
24
of Law.
An everpresent question for the legal community is the degree to
which Posner's personal opinions affect his judicial opinions. In particular,
one must ask whether Posner has acted as an agenda entrepreneur when
judging as well as when writing as a scholar. A recent pregnancy discrimination case, Troupe v. May Department Stores Co.,' provides a window
on Posner's jurisprudence and judging. Disturbingly, Troupe suggests that
Posner's personal hostility to gender discrimination law has infected his
adjudication; it also suggests possible infirmities in Posner's ever-evolving
jurisprudential views.

18. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 3d, supra note 7, § 27.4 (focusing on race discrimination
and concluding that antidiscrimination laws are necessarily inefficient); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 359-61 (1981).
19. See Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 513,
513-14 (1987) [hereinafter Posner, Efficiency and Efficacy] (commenting on John J. Donohue III, Is
Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986) [hereinafter Donohue, Title VII]). The debate
between Posner and John J. Donohue III continued in several law review articles, including John J.
Donohue, Further Thoughts on Employment DiscriminationLegislation: A Reply to Judge Posner, 136
U. PA. L. REV. 523 (1987), Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex DiscriminationLaws, 56
U. Cm. L. REV. 1311 (1989) [hereinafter Posner, Sex Discrimination],and John J. Donohue II,
Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An Economic Perspective, 56 U. Ci. L. REV. 1337
(1989) [hereinafter Donohue, ProhibitingSex Discrimination].
20. Richard A. Posner, Coping With the Caseload:A Comment on Magistrates and Masters, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 2215, 2216 (1989). Ironically, of course, decisions such as the Posner opinion in
Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994) may indeed prompt liberals to support
statecourt jurisdiction over more discrimination claims. See generally Yellow Freight Sys. v.
Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823 (1990) (holding that state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction
over Title VII matters).
21. Posner, Sex Discrimination,supra note 19, at 1311.
22. Id. at 1334.
23. Id. at 1335.
24. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 4th, supra note 7, § 11.7.
25. 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994).
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Kimberly Troupe, a former sales clerk at a Chicago-area Lord &
Taylor department store (part of the May Organization), sued her employer for violating the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 6 when it fired her the
day before she was to go on maternity leave.27 The lower court granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment.8 In an opinion authored by
Posner,29 the Seventh Circuit panel affirmed, precluding Troupe from
obtaining trial scrutiny of her case." This article demonstrates that in
Troupe, Posner erred as a matter of Title VII and summary judgment law
and created a dangerous precedent in the employment discrimination area.
Troupe casts Posner in a poor light in other ways as well. The opinion
reflects complete disinterest in the experience of the working person; in
particular, a woman struggling with morning sickness but attempting to
continue to work and to retain her job.3 The tone of the opinion deprecates Troupe and characterizes her as lazy.32 Troupe also provides an example of the tensions and contradictions that arise between the competing
scholarly views advanced by Posner in his academic writings. In Troupe,
it appears that the judicial Posner fell prey to his own personal prejudices
against pregnancy discrimination law as expressed in his books and articles33 while at the same time contradicting his professed belief that judges generally should show deference to the legislature on matters of social
policy. In addition to this basic contradiction-that Posner may not be
practicing the jurisprudence he seemingly preaches-Troupe illustrates the
potential in Posner's jurisprudential construct for producing judgments
ostensibly defensible on the surface, but which serve merely to enforce the

26. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076, 2076-77 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988)). The Pregnancy Discrimination Act defines discrimination "because of sex" to include discrimination "on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." The Act requires that pregnant women "shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work ... "Id.
27. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 735-36.
28. Id. at 736.
29. Id. at 735.
30. Id. at 739.
31. See id. at 735, 737.
32. See id. at 735 ("[B]ecause she slept later under the new schedule, noon was 'morning' for
her, she continued to experience severe morning sickness at work, causing what her lawyer describes
with understatement as 'slight' or 'occasional' tardiness.").
33. See, e.g., POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIs, 4th, supra note 7, § 11.7, at 337 (arguing an
employer's refusal to pay pregnancy disability benefits is actually efficient discrimination).
34. See Crovitz, supra note 4, at 24 (reporting Posner's distaste for "liberal" judges' lack of
judicial restraint). We term the interplay of these tensions the "Posnerian Contradiction." Although, as
discussed in parts II and IV, infra, one might mount a defense of Posner on consistency grounds; such
a defense in our view leads to a most serious indictment of Posner's jurisprudential thought by casting
it as a formula for result-oriented judging (by our definition rather than Posner's). See infra notes 47071 and accompanying text. Ironically, Posner condemns the lack of candor displayed by other resultoriented judges. Crovitz, supra note 4, at 24.
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judge's own personal preferences.
Troupe is therefore a useful case study for examining the tension
between Posner's academic writings and judicial performance. Ironically,
the suspect reasoning of Troupe eerily echoes that of another prominent
conservative jurist, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, whose sophistic
view of Title VII in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert5 quickly prompted
Congress to overrule the Court by passing the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act.36 Notwithstanding Posner's acknowledgement of the Act and of its
history,37 Troupe demonstrates both a crabbed reading of the law and a
visceral aversion to a broad concept of protection against pregnancy and
gender discrimination similar to that displayed in Gilbert." But despite
its comparative anonymity, Troupe is an even more radical assault on Title
VII. In contravention of the intent expressed by the legislature in passing
the Act, Troupe attempts to recreate the law, molding it into an ineffective
protection for working women who are pregnant.
This article posits that in Troupe, Posner's dislike for the discrimination law and his disaffection for claimants invoking gender discrimination
law overcame his professed commitment to judicial activity constrained by
deference to legislative direction. In contrast, we argue for a more faithful
view of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Part II describes Posner's jurisprudential journey from his early works to his latest book, Overcoming
Law.39 Part III describes Troupe, demonstrating why it fails as a matter
of statutory interpretation and summary judgment law while also highlighting the derogatory language and tone of the opinion. Parts IV and V review Posner's writings on gender discrimination law. We examine Posner
the scholar in an attempt to explain his decision in Troupe and find a
case-specific exercise of personal policy preference. As a result, we have
further examined Posner's stated jurisprudence of pragmatism and practical reason.' The Posnerian cast of these schools of thought proves unfor-

35. 429 U.S. 125, 133-36 (1976) (holding that pregnancy discrimination is not sex discrimination
under Title VII). To be fair, we note that Justice Rehnquist's Gilbert opinion, despite what we and
others regard as its absurd formalism, commanded the votes of six Justices, with only Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens in dissent. Id. at 146 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 160 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Of course, Gilbert was overruled by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988)). See Newport News Shipbuilding
& Dry Dock v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678 (1983).
36. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988)).
37. See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 735 ("The pregnancy-discrimination amendment overruled Gilbert,
but, as the text [of the Act] makes clear, goes further. How much further is the issue in this case.")
(citations omitted).
38. See infra Part III.C.
39. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 7.
40. See infra Part IV (discussing Posner's jurisprudential philosophy).
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tunately susceptible to judicial decisionmaking based on personal
preferences and more linked to his earlier preoccupation with economic

analysis than Posner has portrayed it.
II. POSNER'S JURISPRUDENTIAL JOURNEY

In his recent legal writings, Posner portrays himself as a pragmatic,4'
but we feel his pragmatism is also largely positivist.42 It would be incorrect to simply call Posner a conservative who has moderated with age and
experience (as one could characterize some Supreme Court Justices of the

last thirty years). By his own characterization, Posner has gone through at
least three distinct stages in his approach to statutory construction and law
in general.43
During Posner's second stage-the 1970s-he "pushed the economic
interest-group line hard."' This was the Posner of Economic Analysis of
Law (1973) 4s and The Economics of Justice (1981),' who applied the
economics of public choice to statutes 47 and at least implicitly rejected
the Hart and Sacks view that legislation was dependably rational, purposeful, and public-spirited.' Although Posner might dispute this, his cynical

41. See Posner, A Primer, supra note 6, at 434.
42. Id.; see infra text and notes 101-06. In addition, other observers of Posner's nonjudicial writings have detected a trend toward moderation. See Levinson, supra note 9, at 1251 & n.130. It also
may be a possible attempt to increase his political marketability as a potential Supreme Court nominee.
Accord David A. Logan, The Man in the Mirror, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1739, 1768 (1992) (discussing
vulnerability of Posner as a nominee because of his writings).
By positivist, we mean that Posner has generally supported the view that the law to be obeyed
is that expressed by the legitimately sovereign lawmaker which is, in most statutory cases, Congress or
the relevant state legislature. See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U.
CM. L. REV. 1175 (1989) (delivering a positivist outlook on the role of the judiciary).
43. See Posner, A Primer,supra note 6, at 434.
44. Id.
45. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1st ed. 1973).
46. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
47. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an InterestGroup Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 876-77 (1975).
By public choice perspective, we mean the school that has applied microeconomic concepts to
political behavior and conceived of legislation as the product of a marketplace populated by competing
interests. See id. at 877. Various interests attempt to obtain favorable legislation just as consumers
pursue desired purchases and manufacturers seek new markets and sales. See id. In particular, legislators and other "self-interested actors" seek to maximize their own well-being irrespective of their view
of the merits of proposed legislation. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the
Understandingof PublicLaw, 65 CIH.-KENT L. REv. 123, 126-28 (1989).
48. See Richard A. Posner, Economics,Politics,and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution,
49 U. CI. L. REV. 263, 265 (1982). By the Hart and Sacks view, we refer to the school of thought
dominant in American law during the late 1940s and 1950s, associated with Harvard Law Professors
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks. See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (according to the editors, Hart and Sacks' legal process view was the
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focus on economics and the true motives of the legislature can be seen as
suggesting that judges treat legislation much like common law in rendering decisions.49 Under this approach, statute interpreting courts, like common law courts, would seek wealth-maximizing outcomes and would have
substantial creative freedom unless the "contract" made by legislators with
interest groups was highly directive to the courts or required a certain
interpretation because of reliance interests."
As his second stage continued---during the early and mid1980s-Posner gained judicial experience and advocated a statutory approach that was essentially one of originalism5" and positivism, 2 albeit
without the constraint normally associated with this view of the judge as
"faithful agent" of the legislature. 3 This was the Posner of The Federal

dominant school of jurisprudential thought during the 1950s).
To grossly oversimplify: the Hart and Sacks approach instructed judges to seek to vindicate the
purpose of a statute when construing the statute and to take a functional approach to implementing the
law so that the statute would achieve the legislature's goals. However, Hart and Sacks also stressed
that judges should not substitute their personal assessments for those of the legislature by defining
statutory purpose too broadly or flexibly.
49. This was, of course, exactly what former Yale Law School Dean (now Second Circuit Judge)
Guido Calabresi proposed in 1982. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
(1982); see Allan C. Hutchison & Derek Morgan, Calabresian Sunset: Statutes in the Shade, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1752, 1756-58 (1982). Posner criticized this as too large a shift of power from the
legislature to the judiciary. See POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 7, at 292. But see Hutchison &
Morgan, supra, at 1764-66 (addressing separation of powers issue). In light of Posner's performance in
Troupe and his subsequent embrace of a judge-empowering form of pragmatism (a " 'self-styled
pragmatic' " view, in the words of Robin West; see West, supra note 17, at 2413), Posner can be
viewed as perhaps always giving less deference to the legislative and executive branches than he and
his (largely politically conservative and judicially restraintist) supporters have let on. But see Richard
A. Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 IND. L.J. 1, 22 (1983) [hereinafter Posner, Judicial Self-Restraint] (pointing out that true judicial restraint, ironically, may require a broader reading
than a strict constructionist might prefer). See generally id. (revealing Posner's views on the role of the
judiciary circa 1983).
50. Accord Landes & Posner, supra note 47, at 877-79 (introducing "contract" concept between
legislature and relevant pressure groups, where a freer or truly independent judiciary could undermine
the arrangement).
51. By originalism, we mean the view that an interpreting court should attempt to ascertain the
meaning of the statute as constructed by the enacting legislature rather than attempting to "update" a
statute to conform to more contemporary attitudes among legislators or the public. Most approaches to
statutory interpretation, particularly the popular methods of textualism, intentionalism, and purposivism
are originalist in their goals. See Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the
Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TuL. L. REV.
803, 812-31 (1994).
52. See generally Scalia, supra note 42 (articulating a positivist view of statutory interpretation).
53. See Posner, Legal Formalism, supra note 6, at 185-90. Posner offers Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), as an example of a situation where original intent had to be disregarded.
Posner, Legal Formalism, supra note 6, at 212-15; see also Posner, Classroomand Courtroom, supra
note 6, 817-22. By "faithful agent" conception of the judicial role, we refer to an element of legal
positivism that demands at least a core of judicial deference to legislative judgments. We take issue
with those who view Posner as willing to disregard original intent, because Posner expresses some
deference to it. Posner, Legal Formalism, supra note 6, at 189-92. However, the judge, as Posner has
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Courts-Crisisand Reform, 54 who was seeking to decide statutory cases
as the enacting legislature would have wanted,55 but was permitting himself room for creativity and wisdom.56

Essentially, Posner sought to combine Chicago School law and economics with a Harlanesque conservative's commitment to separation of
powers, legislative supremacy, and judging divorced from personal preferences. Posner expressly rejected evolutionary or dynamic statutory interpretation57 and embraced originalism; the view that the judge acts largely
as an agent of the enacting legislature, which is the body in our political

system holding authority to set national policy via legislation. 8 According to Posner:
The judge who follows [Posner's] suggested approach will not
only consider the language, structure, and history of the statute,
but also study the values and attitudes, as far as they can be
known today, of the period when the legislation was enacted....
The judge's job is not to keep a statute up to date in the sense of
making it reflect contemporary values, but to imagine as best he
can how the legislators who enacted the statute would have wanted it applied to situations they did not foresee.59

analogized to any other agent, is permitted some discretion to carry out the commands of the principal
in situations not specifically envisioned by the principal. Id. Legal commentators may differ substantially, of course, over how much discretion to accord courts while still calling them faithful to the statutes in question, in addition to disagreeing over whether the posited gains from permitting discretion
outweigh the greater opportunities for "unfaithful" statutory interpretation. See id. at 199-201 (pointing
out flaws in Posner's own agency analogy).
54. POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 7.
55. See Posner, A Primer, supra note 6, at 441-49 (exploring several alternative approaches to
statutory interpretation and concluding by advocating a positivist pragmatism which seeks to decide
cases in accord with legislative intent, as discerned in particular cases, through practical reason). Even
when being pragmatic, however, Posner's expressed preference is clearly originalist rather than evolutionary in his statutory construction. See POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 7, at 286-93.
56. POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS, supranote 7, at 286-93.
57. For illustrative examples of these approaches, which permit more judicial freedom to apply a
statute according to current legal norms and social needs, notwithstanding the original intent of the
legislature, see CALABRESI, supra note 49, at 120-62; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479, 1481-82 (1987). Although proponents of dynamism describe
as constrained by sufficiently clear statute drafting or other strong indicia of resolute original intent,
see, e.g., Eskridge, supra, at 1481 & n.8, Posner disapproves of the evolutive approach and seems to
regard it as illegitimate under the American governmental scheme. See POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS,
supra note 7, at 292 ("Although premised on a public-interest conception of legislation, Calabresi's
proposal is not friendly to the legislative process; it contemplates a big shift of legislative power from
the legislatures to the courts."); see also Redish & Chung, supra note 51, at 840-58 (making similar
criticisms of dynamism).
58. See POsNER, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 7, at 286-93. For more recent discussion of
originalist statutory interpretative thought, see Redish & Chung, supranote 51, at 810-14.
59. POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 7, at 287.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

This approach, labeled "imaginative reconstruction,"' thus gives the
judge some room for creativity and flexibility so long as she remains
faithful to the enacting legislature's objectives. 6 It differs from the
textualism championed by more conservative jurists62 in several ways.
Posner expressed a willingness to consider matter outside the text in determining statutory meaning.63 Although originalist, he observed a need for
and legitimacy in having judges fill statutory gaps that might otherwise
fall through textual cracks, and having judges resolve conflicting statutes
by sanding off the rough edges of text to choose the better view among
competing constructions when faced with ambiguous language.' Posner
himself characterizes this approach as purposive-attempting to imaginatively reconstruct the result that the enacting legislature would have wanted in the instant case in order to effect the statute's purpose." Others
have characterized this facet of Posner's statutory interpretation methodology as intentionalist or modified intentionalist. 6 For purposes of our
analysis of Troupe and Posner's interpretative model, the distinction appears unimportant. 67
Posner, in his third stage today, purports to be more eclectic.68 In his

60. Posner, Classroom and Courtroom, supra note 6, at 817.
61. See id.
62. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Cn. L. REV. 533, 534 (1983)
(arguing for greater inquiry into whether statutes are even applicable before beginning the construction
analysis); Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 581, 582-83 (1989-90) (arguing that judges should neither construe statutes liberally to expand
their meaning, nor strictly to constrict their meaning, but rather to get their meaning precisely right);
Scalia, supra note 42, at 1178 (advocating use of general rules over fact-specific determinations for the
judiciary). Posner professes to reject this view just as he rejects dynamism, finding that the
Easterbrook position is "unfriendly to legislation." POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 7, at 292;
see also Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A CriticalComparison of Justices Black and
Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REV. 25, 27-32 (1994) (discussing the two Justices' ostensible desire to minimize
judicial tampering with original texts of the Constitution or statutes).
63. See, e.g., Posner, Classroom and Courtroom, supra note 6, at 818 (advocating use, for example, of contemporary attitudes prevalent at the time of enactment).
64. Accord id. at 818-19 (outlining a broad approach to the statute itself and external factors for a
judge to consider in construction).
65. Posner, A Primer, supra note 6, at 445-46.
66. See Redish & Chung, supra note 51, at 813-15.
67. According to a recent explanation of the sometimes elusive distinction between intentionalism
and purposivism: "Intentionalism asks how the enacting legislature would have decided the interpretive
question facing the court." Redish & Chung, supra note 51, at 813. Meanwhile, "purposivism entails a
more abstract inquiry." Id. at 815. Purposivism does not seek to ascertain the legislature's precise
intent and assumes a reasonable purpose behind the statute (even if the actual objective was a naked
giveaway of public resources to a special interest). Id. at 817. "In addition, rather than dealing with
individual statutes in isolation, purposivism seeks to weave statutes into the whole fabric of statutory
law" and "would tolerate more judicial discretion than would intentionalism." Id.; accord William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretationas PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV.
321, 332-33 (1990) (contrasting intentionalism in discussion of purposivism).
68. See POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 71-78, 269-74, 423-469; Posner, A Primer,
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most recent writings on statutory interpretation, Posner describes himself
as a philosophical pragmatist who applies practical reason to render
decisions.69 According to Posner's description of his current statutory
views, he remains largely an originalist who seeks to discern and apply the
specific intent or general purpose of the enacting legislature in construing
statutes, at least in cases where legislative intent or purpose can be discerned with relative ease and accuracy." But Posner also has relaxed his
originalist views to permit him to interpret' laws flexibly in order to save
the enacting legislature from foolish errors and to seek the optimal result
in particular cases where legislative guidance is lacking or garbled.7' This

approach may even allow him to interpret laws in reference to the legal
landscape beyond the statute under consideration72 or to disregard laws
that are clearly immoral.73 This is the approach to statutes Posner advo74 and other recent writing on statcates in The Problems of Jurisprudence
76
In the recently published Overcoming Law,
utory interpretation.'

supranote 6, at 434, 448-50.
69. See POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 71-123; Posner, A Primer, supra note 6, at
448-50.
70. See Posner, A Primer,supra note 6, at 449-50.
71. See POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 278-302; Posner, A Primer, supra note 6, at
449-50.
72. See POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 272-78.
73. See id. at 229-31; accord Posner, A Primer, supra note 6, at 449-50 (calling for courts, in
rare instances, to disregard the will of the legislature).
74. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 229-31, 272-78.
75. E.g., Posner, A Primer, supra note 6, at 449-50. Although others would surely debate us on
this point, we also believe that this is the Posner of POSNER, SEX AND REASON, supra note 7, and of
POSNER, supranote 1. Although Posner bases much of Sex and Reason on economic analysis, perhaps
even primarily on economic analysis, see West, supra note 17, at 2414-16, he also attempts to support
his views with an eclectic mix of history, politics, sociology, and biology. See id. at 2413; POSNER,
SEX AND REASON, supra note 7, at 1-10. Although he may have gotten much of it wrong, see supra
notes 12, 17, we do not see the book as an example of Posner consciously backtracking from pragmatism and practical reason to economics iiber alles. However, Troupe suggests that economics may
in practice remain first among equals in Posner's house of statutory interpretation. See Troupe, 20 F.3d
at 738 ('If Lord & Taylor would have fired our hypothetical Mr. Troupe, this implies that it fired Ms.
Troupe [the plaintiff] not because she was pregnant but because she cost the company more than she
was worth to it").
Although Cardozo is styled in the manner of a scientific inquiry into the creation and maintenance of reputation, it also reveals Posner's admiration for Cardozo's approach to law which he likens
to his own philosophy of pragmatism. POSNER, supra note 1, at 93; see also Posner, A Primer, supra
note 6, at 449-50. Thus, the book seeks to link subject and author;, the author's implicit message is
that Posner is a lot like Cardozo and deserves similar acclaim and perhaps similar elevation to a higher
judicial post. But see Logan, supra note 42, at 1768 (discussing the vulnerability of Posner as a Supreme Court nominee because of his writings).
76. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw, supra note 7. This book was published after this article was
largely complete, but suggests no major changes in Posner's view of legal analysis and judging. The
attitudes reflected in The Problems ofJurisprudenceare largely brought to bear upon additional topics.
However, Overcoming Law, while fascinating, speaks far less to the craft of judging than do Posner's
previous works cited in text, particularly The Problems of Jurisprudence and The Federal Courts. In

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

Posner does not address the judicial role in statutory interpretation as
directly, 7 but reiterates generally his support for the pragmatic approach
in a manner consistent with The Problems of Jurisprudence.
During his jurisprudential evolution, however, Posner has never officially spurned originalism or legislative supremacy.79 Neither has he rejected economic analysis so long as other interpretative signals do not
foreclose his application of economics to the case at hand." For example,
Posner states that in determining whether to act with freedom or constraint, judges should take their cues from the statute under consideration:
The judge will be particularly alert to any sign of legislative
intent regarding the freedom with which he should exercise his interpretative function. Sometimes a statute will state whether it is to
be broadly or narrowly construed; more often the structure and
language of the statute will supply a clue. If the legislature enacts
into statute law a common law concept, as Congress did when in
the Sherman Act it forbade agreements in restraint of trade, this is
a clue that the courts are to interpret the statute with the freedom
with which they would construe and apply a common law principle-in which event the legislators' values may not be controlling
after all.
The opposite extreme is a statute that sets out its requirements
with some specificity, especially against a background of dissatisfaction with judicial handling of the same subject under a previous

general, Overcoming Law shows Posner to continue on his path of pragmatism with somewhat more
eclectism and irreverence toward law itself as a discipline. In fact, he would perhaps ridicule the notion of judging as a "craft," at least to the extent it implies a precise reproduction of objective legal
results. See id. at 39-70 (assessing changes in the market for the delivery of legal services and the
production of law). In particular, see id. at 60.
With the benefit of hindsight, 1960 can be identified as the highwater mark of the American legal profession's cartel, and hence of jurisprudence as a guild ideology. It was the year
Karl Llewellyn, quondam legal realist, can be said to have thrown in the sponge by publishing a book in which he celebrated in extravagant terms the ineffable "craft" (a word
used obsessively throughout the book) of appellate judging.
Id.
77. His most explicit discussion of the judicial role focuses on constitutional adjudication. See
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 7, ch. 8, at 233-36.
78. See id. ch. 19, at 405 (answering that pragmatist thinking can bring significant improvement
to law even if it fails as a panacea). Posner's pragmatism in Overcoming Law appears to be at least as
positivist as it was in The Problems of Jurisprudence.See id. ch. 7, at 220-23. Regarding labor and
employment matters, Posner continues to have a restrictive view of worker prerogatives. See id. ch. 13,
at 309-11.
79. See, e.g., Steven Walt, Some Problems of Pragmatic Jurisprudence,70 TEx. L. REV. 317,
330-31 (1992) (reviewing POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7) (containing Posner's view circa
1990); supra notes 49-50, 61, 70 and accompanying text.
80. See Posner, A Primer, supra note 6, at 434.
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statute or the common law (much federal labor and regulatory
legislation is of this character).
Often when there are political pressures to do something about a
problem but the legislature cannot agree exactly what to do about
it, it will pass a statute the effect (as well as the undisclosed purpose) of which is to dump the problem in the lap of the courts...
this implies that the courts are expected to try to solve the problem; they have a mandate, though no specific directions [and then]
courts have a duty and not merely a power to solve the problem in
a reasonable way.'
Although the Posner of Problems of Jurisprudence does not seem to
place the same emphasis on economic and public choice factors, 2 neither
can one find the current Posner repudiating this aspect of the middle-stage
Posner. 3 Although still a champion of microeconomic analysis of law,
particularly in common law cases, the modem, moderate Posner professes
to be willing to eschew the quest for efficiency when it conflicts with the
command of the lawmakers. 4 Posner implies that personal political or
social preferences should be strictly limited, if not banished, from judicial
decisionmaking.85 In construing statutes, judges are essentially implementing a "command," even the garbled ones, from legislatures. 6
What appears to make the third-stage Posner different from his intellectual predecessors is his candor in admitting that judges are often left
with relatively little guidance in deciding cases, both common law claims
and those governed by statute.' In these more difficult cases, Posner believes, judges should employ a varied mix of approaches and practical
reason focusing on the consequences of alternative holdings to reach an
acceptable decision. 8 Posner's concept of practical reason essentially
81. POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 7, at 287-88, 290 (footnote omitted).
82. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 286-309 (discussing the interpretation of statutes
and constitutions without relying on economic analysis). Overcoming Law continues in a less overtly
economic vein, but suggests that Posner's pragmatism remains greatly influenced by economic analysis. See, e.g., POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 7, ch. 1, at 35-47; id. ch. 16, at 348-55; id. ch.
26, at 552 (representing "preference for homosexual acts" as a mathematical formula modeling economic incentives); as well as Part Five (philosophical and economic perspectives).
83. See Posner, A Primer,supra note 6, at 434.

84. See id.
85. See POSNER,

JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 272-73; Posner, A Primer,supra note 6, at 450
("Pragmatic concern with case-specific consequences will therefore be confined largely to those cases
where mentalist [intentionalist] or purposive interpretation falls.").
86. See POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 269-73; Posner, A Primer, supra note 6, at

448-49.
87. See, e.g., Posner, A Primer,supra note 6, at 448 ("Often the legislative command is inscrutable....").
88. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 270-302; Posner, A Primer, supra note 6, at 448-
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squares with that of other scholars.89 Although a precise definition of
practical reason has proven elusive, the term generally is regarded as advocating a school of adjudication suggesting that "actual and desirable
decisions are made not by the judge specifying an abstract model and then
deducing the correct rule, but by the exercise of a peculiar faculty called
'judgment,' 'practical wisdom,' or 'practical reason.' "
According to two noted scholars writing specifically about the role of
practical reason in statutory interpretation, the term derives from
Aristotlean philosophy that "starts with the proposition that one can determine what is right in specific cases, even without a universal theory of
what is right."'" Practical reason theory recognizes that the "interpretative
enterprise"92 is one of "concrete situatedness ... which militates against
overarching theories"93 and "recognizes that different values will pull the
interpreter in different directions" 94 but posits that there are "workable
resolutions to complex questions,"95 even, presumably, the problem of
value-driven result-oriented interpretation."
This vision of a practical reason approach to statutory construction
specifically incorporates the American pragmatic philosophical tradition
into the approach.97 Posner considers his approach pragmatic as well in
that he endorses the antifoundationalist98 approaches of notable American

50.
89. Compare Posner, A Primer, supra note 6, at 449-50 (Posner's account of his pragmatic theory) with David E. Van Zandt, An Alternative Theory of PracticalReason in Judicial Decisions, 65
TuL. L. REv. 775, 782-87 (1991) (recounting other thinkers' views of practical reason or common
sense decisionmaking) and Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 67, at 345-62 (describing a combination of
factors which should affect a judge's decision); Vincent A. Wellman, PracticalReasoning and Judicial
Justification: Toward an Adequate Theory, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 45, 89-90 (1985) (introducing the
author's own theory of practical reasoning).
90. Van Zandt, supra note 89, at 778 (footnotes omitted). In addition, practical reason often is
described as or labeled "pragmatism, intuitionism, prudence, [or] common sense." Id.
91. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 67, at 323.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 324.
95. Id.
96. "In practical reasoning we reason from ends to means-from our aims and needs to conclusions about what to do." Wellman, supra note 89, at 87. "[W]e consider the merits of decisions and
plans of action. We are not concerned whether some state of affairs is true or false, but whether instead the plan or decision will serve our purposes and gratify our desires." Id. at 90.
97. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 67, at 323.
98. By antifoundationalist, Posner means that the pragmatist philosophers had few or no absolutes
but approached inquiry with a flexibility and a certain sense that virtually everything in life is a relative matter of degree. See POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 78-82, 462-66 for Posner's views
on authority and truth as he understands those concepts. By contrast, a foundationalist "seeks [or endorses] an objective ground ('foundation') that will reliably guide the interpretation of all statutes in
all situations." Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 67, at 324-25.
Specifically, Posner describes his concept of pragmatism as "looking at problems concretely,
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pragmatic philosophers such as William James, John Dewey, and Richard
Rorty. Posner paints his pragmatism as essentially down-to-earth common sense with a" 'future-oriented instrumentalism.' 0o
To be sure, a figure as prolific and complex as Posner is as hard to
pigeonhole as are the pragmatist and practical reason movements in law. A

significant portion of the academic legal community would probably dispute our reading of Posner's scholarship. Some find him facially inconsis-

tent or ambiguous." 1 Some argue that Posner continues to be dominated
by the wealth-maximizing economist he claims to have left in the dust a
decade or more ago."
Others see his proclaimed pragmatism as considerably less moored to
traditional notions of judicial restraint and deference but have different
reactions to the modem, more flexible Posner. For example, Stanley Fish
and Sanford Levinson largely approve.'0 3 They perhaps see Posner's
views becoming more like their own in his transition from economic analysis and standard conservative judging to a more sensitive and less rigid
jurisprudence.' Others are less sanguine. In a brief but perceptive analysis, Jonathan Simon sees Posnerian pragmatism as a more disturbingly
unleashed, undisciplined beast. 5

experimentally, without illusions, with full awareness of the limitations of human reason, with a sense
of the 'localness' of human knowledge, the difficulty of translations between cultures, the
unattainability of 'truth,' the consequent importance of keeping diverse paths of inquiry open, the
dependence of inquiry on culture and social institutions, and above all the insistence that social
thought and action be evaluated as instruments to valued human goals rather than as ends in themselves." POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 465.
99. See POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 27-28; CORNEL WEST, THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY-A GENEALOGY OF PRAGMATISM 69-70 (1989) (arguing that Dewey represents
the pinnacle of American pragmatist thought).
100. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 28 (quoting WEST, supra note 99, at 5).
101. See, e.g., Eric Rakowski, Posner's Pragmatism, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1681, 1704 (1991) (reviewing POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7) ("Clear away the confused reflections on truth, objectivity, and demonstrability and little is left in the way of constructive argument").
102. See, e.g., Hager, supra note 10, at 9 ("There should be no mistake ... about Posner's continuing allegiance to law and economics jurisprudence.'). In addition, scholars giving negative reviews to
Sex and Reason can be seen as criticizing Posner for having returned to (or never having left) the
single-mindedness of economic analysis. See supra notes 12 & 17. Professor Hadfield makes this
criticism but also chides Posner for improperly applying his posited economic model. See Hadfield,
supra note 17, at 480-82, 491-503.
103. See Fish, supra note 14, at 1447; Levinson, supra note 9, at 1222-28.
104. See, e.g., Fish, supranote 14, at 1456.
105. Jonathan Simon, PragmaticJurisprudence:Power Without Guilt, 56 REV. POL. 465, 466-67
(1991); accord Walt, supra note 79, at 327 (criticizing Posner's practical reason theory as relying on
unreliable "intuitive or inductive judgments'). Posner presumably regards the pragmatist animal as
more housebroken. In any event, he seems to see pragmatism and practical reason as the only path
available to reflective judges. See POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 33 & n.46 (quoting
Voltaire's rejoinder when criticized for having offered no alternative to the Christianity he sought to
debunk: "I save you from a ferocious beast and you ask me what I replace it with"!).
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Whether Posner's judging has held steadfastly to his jurisprudential
theory of adjudication and interpretation presents an interesting question.
Several commentators have suggested that he has not."l A comprehensive evaluation of Posner's jurisprudence is obviously beyond the scope of
our article. In the limited context of Troupe and Posner's approach to the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, it appears that Posner has not lived up to
the intellectual tenets proffered in his academic writing. An equally disturbing prospect is that those intellectual tenets may themselves be faulty.
We now turn to a description of Troupe to examine its failures in light of
the basic tenets of discrimination law.
III. BELOW THE SURFACE OF POSNER'S TROUPE OPINION

A. Twisting Title VII, Distorting Evidentiary Burdens,
and Rushing to Summary Judgment
On June 7, 1991, the day before she was to go on her maternity leave,
Kimberly Troupe was fired from her job as a sales clerk at Lord & Taylor,
a department store chain."0 7 At the time of the discharge, her immediate
supervisor told her that she was going to be fired because her supervisor
believed that Troupe would not return after she had her baby.' Troupe
had worked for Lord & Taylor, both full-time and part-time, for approximately four years.'" Her work, according to the opinion, had been "entirely satisfactory."" 0
About three years after she began working at Lord & Taylor, in December 1990, Troupe had become pregnant and began suffering from
morning sickness of "unusual severity.""' As a result, in January she
asked to return to her former status as a part-time worker, a request Lord
& Taylor granted." 2 Troupe's morning sickness continued and she appeared late for work or left early a number of times during late January
and early February." 3 Lord & Taylor put Troupe on probation." 4
Troupe was late a number of times during the probationary period." 5
However, despite the defendant's claimed displeasure with Troupe's continued tardiness during probation, it did not fire her during or immediately

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 15, at 1118; Shapiro, supra note 16, at 1046.
Troupe, 20 F.3d at 735-36.
Id.
Id. at 735.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. Troupe "reported late to work, or left early, on nine out of the 21 working days." Id.
Id.
Id.
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upon the expiration of the probationary period."6 Instead, the defendant
waited
for more than a week, until the eve of her maternity leave, to fire
7
her."
Troupe sued, alleging gender discrimination, contending that she was
discharged in violation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act."' The defendant claimed that Troupe was fired solely because of her lateness and
moved for summary judgment. "9 The district court granted the motion,' ° and the Seventh Circuit panel affirmed with Posner authoring the
opinion."
The panel's decision appears to have rested on two related theories
advanced by Posner. First, plaintiff was unable to create any triable issues
of fact because, given the evidence in the record, a reasonable jury could
not find that defendant had fired plaintiff because of her pregnancy."
This conclusion rests on an improper application of the evidentiary construct set forth in Supreme Court precedent, combined with an improper
view of the use of summary judgment, to decide Title VII' cases.
The second theory is inextricably linked to the first. It posits that even
if the plaintiff were able to prove that the defendant fired her because she
was about to begin a maternity leave from which the defendant believed
she would not return, this proof would not constitute a violation of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act unless the plaintiff were able to prove that
the defendant had treated a similarly situated nonpregnant employee in a
different manner.'24 This conclusion rests on a simplistic, narrow,
crabbed reading of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and ignores, once
again, the well-established burdens of production and persuasion necessary
to decide a Title VII case.

116. See id. at 735-36.
117. See id. at 735, 737. According to the opinion, the defense attorney stated at oral argument
that Lord & Taylor employees generally receive one-half of their regular pay during a maternity leave.
Id. at 736. It is unclear from the record and the court's opinion whether the maternity leave included
health insurance or other employee benefits. See id. We interpret this omission to mean that the court
assumed that any maternity leave plan providing for one-half pay also undoubtedly provided for continuation of the employee's health insurance during the leave. In our experience, employee leaves are
actually more likely to provide for continued benefits during the time of the leave than to pay continued salary in whole or in part. The opinion found no indication of the length of the leave. Id. at 739.
118. See id. at 736.
119. See id.at 736, 737.
120. Id. at 736.
121. Id. at 735, 739. Judges Easterbrook and Ripple were the others on the panel. Id. at 735.
122. See id. at 737.

123. Id. at 737-39.
124. Id. at 738-39.
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1. Ignoring the Mixed Motives Construct
Kimberly Troupe's complaint alleges a violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,25 as amended by the Civil Rights Act of
1991.116 Troupe responded to the defendant's motion for summary judg-

125. See id. at 735-36 (relying on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78
Stat. 241, 255-57 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993))).
126. See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 735-36 (relying on Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §
107(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. V 1993))). The defendant
could argue, however, that the 1991 Act should not apply retroactively to the case because Lord &
Taylor's allegedly discriminatory conduct took place before the enactment of the 1991 Act. Although
the suit was litigated after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1071 (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.), neither the district court
opinion nor Posner's opinion addresses the question of whether any or all of the provisions of the Act,
conferring rights to a jury trial and compensatory and punitive damages, see 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(b)-(c)
(Supp. V 1993), apply retroactively to the case. The 1991 Act was enacted into law on November 21,
1991 and contains a provision stating that the provisions of the Act "take effect upon enactment." Pub.
L. No. 102-166, § 402(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1099 (1991). In Troupe, the alleged illegal conduct occurred
in June 1991, five months before the statute was enacted. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 735. The complaint was
not filed until after enactment. See Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., No. 92-C2605, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7751, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 1993). The trial and appellate courts should have discussed
whether the provisions of the 1991 Act applied where the complaint was not filed until after the Act
took effect but the alleged wrongful conduct took place before enactment.
The answer to this question is relevant to the Troupe result in two respects. First, if the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 does not apply retroactively to Troupe, there would be no right to a jury. See 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (Supp. V 1993) (granting jury trial in Title VII cases). That Troupe may not have
had a right to a jury trial does not affect our conclusion, however, that the court of appeals wrongfully
affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment. See infra Part III.A.1. The factfinder, whether
it be the judge or jury, should decide issues of fact at trial when disputed intent exists upon which live
witnesses will shed light on the issue. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322-23 (1986) (setting forth summary judgment standard). If there is a right to a jury trial, however, the improper grant of summary judgment will not only deny the statutory right but also may
violate the Seventh Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (granting a right to trial by jury in
"suits at common law").
Second, the Act overrules in part the decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
244-45 (1989) (plurality opinion) (finding that defendants in mixed motive cases can be absolved of
liability with a showing that they "would have made the same decision even" if impermissible discrimination had not occurred). Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. V 1993)) (permitting recovery where illegal discrimination "was a motivating factor" in an employment decision). If that section does not apply retroactively, Price Waterhouse, rather than the 1991 Act, sets the standard against which we must judge Posner's analysis assuming that Troupe presents a mixed motives case. See infra notes 132-44 and accompanying text.
After Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1506-08 (1994) (holding that the right to a
jury trial cannot be applied retroactively in a case pending on appeal when the Civil Rights Act of
1991 was enacted because the Act links the right to a jury trial to the grant of compensatory and punitive damages) and Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1510, 1514-15 (1994) (holding that §
101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which overruled Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164
(1989), is not retroactive), it appears that the parts of the new statute granting a right to a jury trial, 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(1) (Supp. V 1993), and overruling Price Waterhouse, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), do
not apply retroactively to Troupe. Arguably, Landgrafand Rivers could be distinguished because both
cases were pending on appeal at the time the statute was enacted, whereas Troupe had not yet filed her
suit at the time of enactment. See Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1514; Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1488. But the
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ment by submitting direct and circumstantial evidence of discrimination.
The direct evidence was her supervisor's comment immediately before
Troupe was fired that she "was going to be terminated because [the supervisor] didn't think [Troupe] was coming back to work after [she] had
[her] baby."'" Her superintendent's unsupported belief, either real or
feigned, totally contradicted the evidence in the record. Troupe averred in
her affidavit that she had never told her supervisor that she did not intend
to return after the birth of her baby and that it was her intention to return
to the job." The defendant responded by claiming that it did not fire
Troupe because of her impending maternity leave, but rather, it fired her
she had been late for work a number of times during her pregnanbecause
12 9

cy

The circumstantial evidence Troupe submitted in response to the motion for summary judgment was the suspicious timing of her termination
and various documents, including her doctor's notes to her supervisor
asking to excuse Troupe for her lateness due to morning sickness and her
supervisor's notes in response that Troupe had been late with "no excuses. 9' 3 This evidence suggests two possible evidentiary constructs: the

language in Landgrafand Rivers focuses heavily on the time when the conduct occurs as the key date
in determining whether the statute should apply; both seem to assume that if the conduct occurs before
enactment, the Act will not apply. See Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1514-14; Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1489.
Although we may disagree with the result in Landgraf and Rivers, if Posner reached the conclusion
implicitly in Troupe that the 1991 Act should not apply retroactively, we cannot fault his result given
the lack of clarity with which Congress addressed the issue. In fact, given the political compromises
that had to be reached to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it appears that Congress decided to leave
the clause concerning retroactivity ambiguous, allowing the courts to determine the question. See Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1516-17 (discussing effect of President Bush's veto of a 1990 version of the Act on
language concerning retroactivity). If the 1991 Act did not apply retroactively to Troupe, see supra
note 126, the court would apply the existing antidiscrimination provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 as amended. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255-57 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988)); supra note 126. It is unclear from the record whether the
defendant expressly raised the retroactivity issue. The district judge's opinion states that the plaintiff
brought suit pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Troupe, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7751, at *3.
Posner's opinion does not state whether the court was applying the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the
new amendments to the Act passed in 1991. Rather, it focuses on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988). See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 735. Because it appears that the district court applied the earlier act, Troupe, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7751, at *3, and subsequent cases strongly suggest that the 1991 Act would not apply to Troupe, see supra note 126, we analyze Posner's opinion
initially assuming that the earlier version of the law applied to the case. We also will comment on how
the Act would change the analysis concerning the plaintiff's proof and the motion for summary judgment.
127. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 736.
128. Aff. of Kimberly Hem Troupe, Mar. 5, 1993, at J[ 24. This testimony is especially credible
because, according to her attorney, Troupe did return to work after her baby was born in a retailing
job at a competitor's establishment. Telephone Interview with Ernest Rosiello, Esq., counsel for plaintiff (July 20, 1994).
129. Troupe, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7751, at *8-*9.
130. See Lord & Taylor, Record of Interview completed by Jennifer Rauch, Feb. 18, 1991 (PI.'s
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"mixed motives" approach' and the McDonnell Douglas disparate treatment approach.'32 Posner ignores the possibility of a mixed motives standard and applies a combination of a distorted McDonnell Douglas analysis
with an overall gestalt approach.
Before the enactment of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, cases involving
mixed motives were governed by Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,'33 a case
that determined the proper allocation of the respective burdens of proof in
discrimination cases presenting mixed motives. Although there were various opinions involving issues of mixed motives written by the Supreme
Court, in Price Waterhouse a majority of the Supreme Court Justices
agreed that when the plaintiff can prove by "direct evidence"' 34 that an
illegitimate reason-that is, a reason related to race, sex, color, and national origin-was a "substantial"'35 factor in the employment decision, the
burden shifts to the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that it would have made the same decision even absent the illegitimate
motive."' According to Price Waterhouse, if the defendant is able to
meet its burden of proof, it avoids liability under Title VII. 137

Ex. G. in Opp'n to Summ. J., Troupe app. at A-45).
131. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45 (plurality opinion) (overruled by 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2m (Supp. V 1993)).
132. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
133. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
134. Id. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring). It remains unclear, however, that the plaintiff must
prove discrimination, after Price Waterhouse, in order to benefit from the shift in the burden of proof
to the defendant, by direct evidence. A plurality of the Supreme Court (Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens) seemingly would not require direct evidence of discriminatory animus, i.e.,
evidence not requiring an inferential leap to support an initial finding of unlawful discrimination. See
Ann C. McGinley, Reinventing Reality: The Impermissible Intrusion of After-Acquired Evidence in
Title VII Litigation, 26 CoNN. L. REv. 145, 158 & n.91 (1993). The concurrence authored by Justice
O'Connor, however, would require such direct evidence. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276
(O'Connor, J., concurring). It is also unclear whether Justice White would require proof by direct
evidence, but he states that he adopts Justice O'Connor's characterization of the plaintiff's burden. Id.
at 259 (White, J., concurring). Because either Justice O'Connor or Justice White's support would have
been necessary to form a majority, it appears that direct evidence may be required under Hopkins.
McGinley, supra, at 158 n.91. The 1991 Act does not require direct evidence. It merely requires that a
plaintiff demonstrate that "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)
(Supp. V 1993).
135. The plurality would require the plaintiff to prove that illegal discrimination was merely a
"motivating" factor. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (plurality opinion). The concurrences used the
term "substantial" factor. Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring); id. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The
difference between these two standards is unclear, but arguably the concurring Justices saw the substantial factor test as at least slightly more rigorous. Congress adopted the plurality's "motivating"
factor test, see id. at 258, when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)
(Supp. V 1993).
136. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45, 258 (plurality opinion); id. at 259-60 (White, J., concurring); id. at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
137. This portion of the Supreme Court opinion was overruled legislatively. See 42 U.S.C. §
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In Troupe's case, the submission of her superintendent's statement
combined with the timing of her discharge was sufficient evidence from
which a reasonable factfmder could conclude that the plaintiff's pregnancy
was a substantial factor in the decision to fire her. A reasonable factfmder
could conclude that the defendant fired Troupe, at least in part, because it
did not want to pay her maternity benefits or to hold her job open because
it believed that Troupe did not intend to return to the job after the birth of
her baby.
This finding, under Price Waterhouse, would shift the burden to Lord
& Taylor to prove that it would have fired Troupe even if she had not
been pregnant and about to take maternity leave.' At this point, Lord &
Taylor could submit evidence of Troupe's tardiness in order to try to
convince the factfmder that it would have fired her for lateness in spite of
its illegitimate motivation in firing her. 9 If the defendant could convince the factfmder that it would have fired Troupe anyway, it would be
relieved of all liability."' If the defendant could not prove that it would
have fired Troupe absent the discriminatory reason, it would be subject to
the remedies provided by the 1964 Act.'41
In Troupe, the federal district court concluded that the plaintiff had no
direct evidence of discrimination, and therefore, could not employ the
mixed motives approach to prove her case.'42 Defining direct evidence as
evidence tending "to establish the fact without the need for inference or
presumption,"'43 the district court stated that the "plaintiff's allegations
regarding supervisor Rauch's comment do not directly speak to the issue
of discrimination."'" Therefore, the court addressed the case under the
McDonnell Douglas analysis-the indirect method of proof described
below.'45

2000e-2(m) (Supp. V 1993).
138. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text. Under the 1991 Act, the burden would shift
to the defendant to prove the same thing. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1993). The difference is
the effect that this proof would have. Under Price Waterhouse, if a defendant employer meets this
burden, it is relieved of all liability. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258. Under the 1991 Act, if the
defendant meets this burden, it is relieved of backpay, and reinstatement, compensatory and punitive
damages. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1993). The defendant still would be liable, however,
for attorneys fees and costs that are directly attributable to the claim of an impermissible employment
practice, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief other than reinstatement. Id.
139. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45 (plurality opinion); id. at 259-60 (White, J., concur-

ring).
140. Id. at 258 (plurality opinion); see id. at 259-60 (White, J., concurring).
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), (k) (1988); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45.
142. Troupe v. May Dep't Stores, No. 92-C2605, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7751, at *7 (N.D. Ill.
June 3, 1993).

143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at *8; see infra notes 202-49 and accompanying text.
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The trial court did not explain why it reached the conclusion that
Troupe's supervisor's statement was not direct evidence of pregnancy
discrimination."4 In Randle v. LaSalle Telecommunications,47 the Seventh Circuit explained that in order to shift the burden in a mixed motives
case, the evidence need only: (1) "speak directly to the issue of discriminatory intent" and (2) "relate to the specific employment decision in
question."'4 s
Troupe's evidence met this test of direct evidence.'49 First, there is
no question that it related to the specific employment decision in question.
Her supervisor, immediately before her firing, told her that she would be
fired because the supervisor did not believe that Troupe would be returning from her pregnancy leave. 5 ' Although the supervisor claimed not to
have the authority to discharge Troupe, this lack of authority is inconsequential. The supervisor evidently had knowledge that Troupe was about
to be terminated and she gave Troupe the information she possessed. 5 '
Second, although the supervisor did not say that Troupe would be
fired because of her pregnancy, this statement comes very close to making
a damning admission. Certainly, because Title VII forbids making adverse
employment decisions on the basis of sexual stereotyping,'52 the admission that the defendant intended to fire Troupe because of a stereotype
provides direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination.'53 This evidence is
a far cry from the "stray remarks" that Justice O'Connor explains are
insufficient to prove that gender played a part in the employment decision.'54
On appeal, Judge Posner refused to analyze the case in terms of direct
and indirect evidence or in terms of single or mixed motives. Instead, he
concluded that a plaintiff can survive summary judgment by presenting
different kinds and combinations of evidence from which a rational
factfinder could conclude that the defendant had discriminated against her
because she was a member of a protected group.' Although this approach may appear correct, its deployment in this case ignored the method

146. See Troupe, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7751, at *7.
147. 876 F.2d 563 (7th Cir. 1989).
148. Id. at 569.
149. See Cmokrak v. Evangelical Health Sys. Corp., 819 F. Supp. 737, 744 n.3 (N.D. Ill.
1993)
(stating judge's opinion that, under Price Waterhouse, the defendant's statement that if the plaintiff
had not taken pregnancy leave, she would not have been demoted is direct evidence that shifts the
burden of persuasion to the defendant).
150. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 735-36.
151. See id.
152. See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1116-20 (D.D.C. 1985).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 147-48.
154. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
155. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 736.
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of proof necessary in a mixed motives case.

6

In spite of the Supreme Court's holding in Price Waterhouse that
courts must shift the burden of proof to the defendant once the plaintiff
proves that discrimination was a substantial factor in the employment decision, 7 Posner neither discussed nor applied the "mixed motives" approach. 8 He avoided its application by relying on a cramped, improper
reading of Title VII law in general, and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
in particular.
Posner concluded as a matter of law that Troupe could not prove
illegal discrimination even assuming Troupe proved that Lord & Taylor
fired her in order to avoid paying maternity benefits or because it believed
that she would not return after her leave." 9 According to Posner, Troupe
could not prove a violation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act unless
she produced evidence of a similarly situated nonpregnant employee who
was not fired before taking disability leave."6 In the absence of such

156. The question is who should bear the risk of uncertainty at the pretrial stage of the litigation.
Because the defendant has admitted that it was going to fire the plaintiff because of its fears that she
would not return, id. at 735-36, a reason that is so closely linked to the plaintiff's pregnancy and that
it, in itself, amounts to illegal sexual stereotyping of the pregnant woman's future work intentions, the
burden should rest on the defendant to prove that it treated similarly situated nonpregnant employees
the same as it treated Troupe.
This is not a new or radical idea. Even where there is no evidence of mixed motives, courts
faced with direct evidence of discrimination or a facially discriminatory policy have shifted the burden
of proof to the defendant to prove that either it treated nonpregnant employees similarly, or that
nonpregnancy was a bona fide occupational qualification for the job, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)
(1988), thereby relieving the defendant of liability. See International Union, United Auto., Aerospace
& Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200 (1991) (placing
onus of proof on employer to establish bona fide occupational qualification defense, under 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(e) (1988), where employer prohibited women of child-bearing age from working in a battery
manufacturing division because of potential lead danger to unborn fetuses); Carney v. Martin Luther
Home, Inc., 824 F.2d 643, 648-49, 648 n.5 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that the defendant made no attempt
to prove that it treated nonpregnant individuals who had similar physical or medical restrictions on the
weight they could lift the same as plaintiff, and holding that the defendant could escape liability only
if it proved that nonpregnancy was a bona fide occupational qualification for the job); Hayes v. Shelby
Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1548-49 (1lth Cir. 1984) (holding that where x-ray technician is
removed from her position during pregnancy to protect the fetus, employer must demonstrate that
nonpregnancy is a bona fide occupational qualification for the job).
157. See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
158. See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 736-37.
159. Id. at 737-38.
160. Id. at 738-39. Posner's approach requires the plaintiffs to present at the summary judgment
stage comparative evidence of a similarly situated nonpregnant employee in order to survive the
defendant's motion for summary judgment. See id. Intuitively, this requirement is burdensome for the
plaintiffs because it may be difficult, if not impossible, to find a comparable situation, especially
where the employer is a small business. By chance or misfortune, there may not be another employee
to whom a pregnant employee can compare herself even in the face of egregious intentional discrimination. Compounding the problem is the likely reluctance of employer defendants to produce this type
of evidence during discovery if it is damaging to their case. As a result, under Posner's comparative
evidence mandate, many pregnant employees who are fired precisely because they are pregnant will
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proof in response to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, he
concluded that the plaintiff must lose the case because she has the burden
of proving discrimination at trial.'
Posner supports his decision by claiming that firing Troupe would be
perfectly permissible under the discrimination laws if the company would
fire a similarly situated male who is about to take medical leave. 6 The
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, according to Posner, does not require the
employer to grant special treatment to the pregnant employee; it guarantees only that the pregnant employee be treated the same as other employees.

163

In reaching this conclusion, however, Posner disregards the evidentiary
construct of Price Waterhouse, a procedure that would shift to the employer the burden to prove that it treated similarly situated nonpregnant
employees the same.'64 By disregarding the mixed motives construct,
Posner alters substantive Title VII law, grafting onto substantive discrimi-

lose their substantive rights based on the sheer difficulty of meeting Posner's new procedural requirement. The mixed motives approach, in contrast, would more effectively protect the plaintiffs from
illegal pregnancy discrimination. To Posner's credit, he suggests that a remedy might be available to
plaintiffs such as Troupe even in the absence of such comparative evidence. See id. at 738-39. Troupe,
however, was not entitled to such consideration because she did not argue for it. See id. at 739 ("What
to do in such a case is an issue for a case in which the issue is raised.").
161. Id. at 738; see also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)
(discussing plaintiff's burden of proof).
162. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 737-39.
163. Id. at 738-39. There has been much commentary on what "equal" treatment means in this
context. See Melissa Feinberg, Note, After California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra:
The Parameters of the Pregnancy DiscriminationAct, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 141, 144-46 (1989). Some
feminists believe women should be treated exactly the same as men in order to achieve true equality.
Id. at 144-45. This view holds that even though women may be different from men, the only way to
true equality is through assimilation into the male workplace. See id. The notion is that to grant women any special privileges based on their pregnancies or other differing characteristics would open the
door to protective legislation that perpetuates inaccurate stereotypes about women. Id. at 145. Posner's
reading of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act appears to adopt this view. See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738.
The "differences" or pluralist approach argues, on the other hand, that the law must take into
account the biological differences (and perhaps the social and psychological differences) of women in
order to achieve true equality for women. Feinberg, supra, at 145-46. See generally Nancy E. Dowd,
Maternity Leave: Taking Sex Differences Into Account, 54 FORD. L. REV. 699 (1986) (discussing the
feasibility and legality of legislation requiring employers to grant maternity leave); Herma H. Kay,
Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1985) (discussing
ways to accommodate pregnancy in the workplace in spite of past use of biological differences between men and women to justify exclusion of women from the male-dominated world).
For a recent example of insensitivity to the impact of pregnancy and consequent job reassignment by an employer, and a court's quick acceptance of the employer's perspective, see Elie v. KMart Corp., 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 957, 959-60 (E.D. La. 1994). Unfortunately, Elie, like
Troupe, has the potential to create influential precedent. See Stephanie B. Goldberg, Pregnancy Discrimination-PlaintiffsFace DisparateImpact Hurdle, A.B.A. J., June 1994, at 66, 66 (discussing Elie
and Troupe).
164. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45 (plurality opinion).
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nation law the procedural requirement of demonstrating that nonpregnant
employees were treated differently.' 5 His error looms even larger in the
summary judgment context." 6 His improper placement of the burdens of

production and persuasion on a plaintiff who is defending against a motion
for summary judgment wrongfully denied her the right to have a neutral

factfinder decide her discrimination claim against her employer."

165. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
166. In cases whose facts are very similar to those in Troupe, other courts have concluded that
summary judgment is inappropriate. See, e.g., Thompson v. La Petite Academy, Inc., 838 F. Supp.
1474, 1477-78 (D. Kan. 1993) (denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment based on
employer's comment that the plaintiffs attitude had changed since she became pregnant); Crnokrak v.
Evangelical Health Sys. Corp., 819 F. Supp. 737, 742-43 (N.D. El. 1993) (denying the defendant's
motion for summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the defendant replaced the plaintiff while she was on maternity leave due to hostility toward her pregnancy);
Estrada v. Donnelly Corp., 708 F. Supp. 834, 837 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (denying the defendant's motion
for summary judgment where the plaintiff was allegedly fired for her absenteeism rather than as a
result of her pregnancy).
167. Posner relies on two analogies to justify the panel's conclusion. First, he employs an inapt
analogy to a hypothetical race discrimination claim. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738. Posner compares Troupe's
situation to that of a black employee who, just before he goes on leave for a kidney operation, is fired
so that the employer can save the cost of the leave. Id. Concluding that the black employee could not
prevail against his employer in a race discrimination claim, Posner states that this would not make out
a case of race discrimination unless the employer were not just as heartless in dealing with white
employees. Id.
The analogy between the black kidney transplant patient and Troupe is so inappropriate that it
raises questions as to the objectivity with which Posner approaches the subject matter of the suit. The
black kidney patient does not undergo transplant surgery because he is black. Rather, he happens to be
a man of color who also needs a kidney transplant. A working woman like Troupe, on the other hand,
must take a maternity leave precisely for the reason that the law protects her from discrimination: her
pregnancy.
But Posner also advances a second hypothetical that at first appearance is more difficult to
refute. He compares Troupe to an imaginary Mr. Troupe who, because of illness, arrives at work late
and takes a planned medical leave. Id. Posner concludes that if the employer would have also fired
Mr. Troupe before his medical leave in order to save itself the cost of the medical benefits or because
it did not believe that Mr. Troupe would return from his leave, then Ms. Troupe cannot claim that she
was discriminated against because of her pregnancy. Id.
This second analogy, although more convincing than the first, does not save the day for Lord
& Taylor. It is infirm for a number of reasons: the failure to employ the mixed motives approach and
the difficulty many employees will have obtaining suitable comparative evidence, see supra note 160
and accompanying text; the discriminatory stereotype associated with the pregnant employee that she
will not return after her maternity leave, see supra text accompanying notes 152-53; and the evidence
of congressional intent and purpose in passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act which should be read
to prohibit firing a pregnant employee in order to avoid paying maternity benefits. Cf. California Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 284-92 (1987) (reading the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
expansively and finding it permits states to require maternity leave benefits, given the Pregnancy Discrimination Act's original purpose of protecting pregnant women from employment discrimination).
Troupe's misleading hypotheticals are vulnerable to counter-hypotheticals. For example, one
might wonder if an employer sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336,
104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993) and scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.), could benefit from summary judgment if it fired an otherwise capable worker
who was frequently tardy due to the side effects of chemotherapy. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. V
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2. Sexual Stereotyping as a Matter of Law
Posner would likely respond that the comments made by the defendant
are not sufficient as a matter of law to prove that pregnancy was a substantial factor in the decision to terminate Troupe. 6 ' Apparently, he
would argue that firing Troupe based on her predicted failure to return to
work is not pregnancy discrimination, but rather an employer's decision
based on her absence from work.169 The basis for this argument is Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins' where the Supreme Court held that firing an older employee solely because his pension was about to vest did not constitute age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA)."' But this reasoning ignores precedent holding that an employer who makes an adverse employment decision as a result of sexual stereotyping is guilty of sex discrimination under Title VII. It distorts the
holding in Hazen Paper and it flouts the legislative purpose of Title VII
generally and, more specifically, that of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act.'73
In Price Waterhouse, the district court found that the partnership of a
large accounting firm had denied a female accountant's bid for partnership, in part, because it had engaged in illegal sexual stereotyping. 7 4 For
example, one partner had described Hopkins as "macho,""' while another said that she should "take a course in charm school."' 76 Others advised Hopkins to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, wear

1993) (prohibiting discrimination against a "qualified individual with a disability," as defined in 42
U.S.C. § 12111(8)-(10) (Supp. V 1993)). Where the source of the problem is so closely linked to the
reason for discharge, pinpointing the employer's real reasons would seemingly require a trial on its
merits.
168. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
169. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738. But see Crnokrak, 819 F. Supp. at 739, 743-44 (rumors that a woman on pregnancy leave is not going to return, among other factors, do not absolve the employer from
liability for replacing her if the employer had discriminatory animus).
170. 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993).
171. Id. at 1705-08 (interpreting Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Pub. L. No. 90202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993))). The
ADEA prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of age, see 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988), or
against persons 40 years of age or older, 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (Supp. V 1993).
172. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250-51.
173. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988)) was "intended ...to end discrimination against pregnant workers." Guerra,
479 U.S. at 286. The Supreme Court has determined that the Act will be construed to effect its purposes, and not necessarily according to its language alone. Id. at 284. The legislative history of the Act
cited by the Court suggests that women, after the passage of the Act, should no longer have to choose
between a career and a family. Id. at 286 n.19 (quoting 124 CONG. REc. 21,442 (1978) (remarks of
Rep. Tsongas)).
174. 490 U.S. at 236-37 (plurality opinion).
175. Id. at 235 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
176. Id. (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry."'" I The Supreme Court
plurality and concurring opinions agreed that adverse employment decisions resulting from sex stereotyping violate Title VII. 78
Like Ann Hopkins, Kimberly Troupe appears to have fallen victim to
sex stereotyping. Drawing all reasonable inferences in Troupe's favor, as

is the court's obligation on a motion for summary judgment,

9

the panel

should have reversed the lower court's summary judgment. It should have
concluded that a reasonable factfmder could conclude that the defendant
fired Troupe, at least in part, because it decided, without factual basis to
support its belief, that Troupe would not return to work after her baby was

born.8' Lord & Taylor would most likely not have reached this conclusion for a similarly situated nonpregnant employee who was about to
take disability leave.' Posner approved the use of a stereotype when he
permitted the defendant to assume that Troupe would not return to work
after the birth of her baby.' It is the prevalence of exactly this type of
stereotype
that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was enacted to over18 3
come.
Posner characterizes the defendant's actions as distinct from discrimination based on pregnancy.'84 Rather, he concludes, even if one were to
accept the veracity of the supervisor's admission, one could conclude only
that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of her
absence from work.' This is not pregnancy discrimination, he concludes, unless the defendant treated other workers who went on disability
leave differently.'86 In support of this argument, Posner relies on Hazen

177. Id. (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
178. Id. at 250-51 (plurality opinion); id. at 272 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see id. at 260 (White,
J., concurring) (referring to defendant's "unlawful motive").
179. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress
& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)).
180. See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 736.
181. A nonpregnant employee could truly be similarly situated only if the leave he was about to
take would cure him of the disability for which the leave was designed, just as maternity leave will
"cure" a new mother of her physical disability.
182. See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 737-38.
183. See supra note 173; accord supra notes 37-38.
184. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 737-39.
185. Id. at 738-39.
186. Id. Even if this is true, the defendant's intent is relevant to the question of whether the plaintiff was dismissed as a result of discriminatory animus. See Crnokrak v. Evangelical Health Sys. Corp.,
819 F. Supp. 737, 743 (N.D. Ill. 1993). This intent is difficult to ascertain absent a trial. See id.
Troupe presented evidence to the court from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that her
supervisor harbored hostilities toward her because of her pregnancy. This evidence includes the fact of
Troupe's morning sickness, see Troupe, 20 F.3d at 735, 737, and an internal report of her supervisor
stating that Troupe had "No Excuses" for her lateness, Troupe v. May Dep't Stores, No. 92-C2605,
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7751, at *6-*7 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 1993). From these two bits of evidence,
which make it obvious that the supervisor knew at the time she wrote her "No Excuses" comment that

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

29

Florida Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

Paper.'87 This reliance, however, is misplaced. In Hazen Paper, the defendant had a pension plan that required its employees to work for the
company for ten years before vesting.'88 The plaintiff, a 62-year-old
man, was fired only a few weeks before his pension vested, and sued pursuant to the ADEA.'89 The Court held unanimously that discrimination
against an older employee on the eve of pension vesting does not in and
of itself violate the ADEA.' 9
The Court reasoned that although there is often a correlation between
age and years required for a pension to vest, a decision to fire an employee solely to avoid pension vesting is distinct from the decision to fire
someone because he is too old for the job.'9' In reaching this decision,
the Court invoked prior caselaw on the legislative history of the
ADEA.'9 2 According to the Court, Congress passed the ADEA because it
was concerned that employers were making employment decisions regarding elderly persons based on "inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes" that
an employee's productivity and competence decline with age. 93 Deciding to fire an employee solely because he has more than nine years of
service and his pension will vest when he reaches ten years of service
does not constitute age discrimination because the stigmatizing stereotype
"would not have figured in" the decision. 94 This lack of stigmatizing
stereotype is the basis for the Court's decision in Hazen Paper.
Moreover, the Supreme Court noted that although there often may be
a correlation between age and the vesting of one's pension,"5 the two
factors are not the same. 96 An employee at defendant's workplace could
have his pension vest before reaching age forty, the age at which the
ADEA protects plaintiffs from discrimination."' 7 Thus, the vesting of the
pension and the worker's age, according to the Court, are analytically distinct.'98 Not so for pregnancy leave and pregnancy. A woman's preg-

it was untrue, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that her supervisor harbored hostility toward the
plaintiff based on her pregnancy.
187. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738 (citing Hazen Paper, 113 S. Ct. at 1707); see supra notes 170-71 and
accompanying text.
188. Hazen Paper, 113 S. Ct. at 1704.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1705-08.
191. Id. at 1706-08.
192. Id. at 1706 (citing EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 231 (1983)).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1707.
195. The Court has not addressed whether "disparate impact" theory, however, applies to ADEA
cases. Id. at 1706. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that it does.
Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981).
196. See Hazen Paper, 113 S. Ct. at 1707.
197. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (Supp. V 1993).
198. We do not intend to imply that we agree with the Hazen Paper decision. But that analysis is
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nancy leave is inextricably linked to her pregnancy. It is obviously impossible to give birth without being pregnant; it is practically impossible to
give birth and recover from the birth experience without a period of disability. 199
Moreover, Posner ignores that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was
passed in part to overcome the damaging stereotypes about women and
motherhood that often caused employers to make adverse employment
decisions about pregnant women.' The purpose of the Act, like the purpose of the ADEA, was to make it illegal for the employer to act in response to these stigmatizing, inaccurate stereotypes."'
3. Distorting the McDonnell Douglas Approach
Where there is no evidence of mixed motives, and the parties rely on
circumstantial evidence, courts should employ the approach set forth in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,' Furnco Construction Corp. v.
Waters, ° and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine.'
Under this methodology, courts analyze a disparate treatment case under
Title VII by resorting to a three-part method of allocating the burdens of
persuasion and production.2 5 In disparate treatment cases, the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant intentionally discriminated against her. 3
Because intent is difficult to prove, the Supreme Court departed from the
traditional order of proof in order "to ease the evidentiary burdens on
employment discrimination plaintiffs, who rarely are fortunate enough to
have access to direct evidence of intentional discrimination."
Under
the McDonnell Douglas construct, in order to prove a prima facie case, the
plaintiff must prove: (1) she is a member of the protected class; (2) she is
qualified"'s for the position; (3) she was fired from the position; and (4)

beyond the scope of this article. We recognize that Posner was bound by the Hazen Paper case, and,
therefore, we would not expect him to challenge the Court's reasoning. We merely intend to show
that, assuming Hazen Paper is the law, it does not require, nor even endorse, the reasoning and result
of Troupe.

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

See Kay, supra note 163, at 25 & n.137.
See infra notes 306-28 and accompanying text.
See infra text and notes 306-28; supra text accompanying note 193.
411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).
438 U.S. 567, 575-78 (1978).
450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981).

205. See Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of
Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REv. 203, 214-21 (1993) for a detailed

explanation of the McDonnellDouglas approach.
206. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-56.
207. Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590, 595 (11th Cir. 1987).
208. Unfortunately, a number of courts have transferred the traditional McDonnell Douglas test
into a much greater hurdle than it was originally. For example, a number of circuits require a plaintiff
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other employees who were not members of the protected class were retained2" in their positions.1 0 Once the plaintiff proves a prima facie

to prove that she was meeting her employer's legitimate expectations in order to prove that she was
qualified for the position. See cases cited in McGinley, supra note 205, at 231 n.125. Originally, the
"qualified" requirement meant merely that the employee possessed the requisite education and training
for the position. Id. at 230-3 1. The conversion of the objective "qualified" standard into a more subjective employer expectations standard is unfortunate, because the employer's expectations should be
dealt with in the final, or pretext portion of the three-stage approach. At the second stage, the employer attempts to offer a permissible reason for its employment decision. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-56.
Finally, the plaintiff has the opportunity to prove that the articulated reason is merely a pretext for
intentional impermissible discrimination. Id. at 256. Here, it should be more difficult to get summary
judgment because there are frequently factual questions and issues of intent. Given that the purpose of
the McDonnell Douglas approach was to aid plaintiffs in proving their cases, see supra text accompanying note 207, this collapse of the three stages is harmful to the substantive rights of civil rights
plaintiffs. See McGinley, supra note 205, at 230-31 & n.125. The Supreme Court probably agrees. In
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), the Court cited the district court's use of
McDonnell Douglas, and its "qualified" prong, see McDonnellDouglas, 411 U.S. at 802, with approval. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 113 S. Ct. at 2747 (citing Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp.
1244, 1249 (E.D. Mo. 1991) ("[stating that plaintiff] met applicable job qualifications")). This was not
the issue before the Supreme Court, however. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 113 S. Ct. at 2747.
209. Cf., eg., Guerin v. AT & T Co., No. C-93-1522, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7501, at *9 (N.D.
Cal. June 1, 1994) (using Title VII framework in state racial discrimination case). Some courts, when
pregnancy discrimination is alleged, may require the plaintiff to prove that she received treatment that
was different from that received by similarly situated nonpregnant employees in order to make out the
fourth prong of the prima facie case. See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738-39; cf. White v. Dial Corp., No. 91C6058, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6481, at *8 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 1994) (examining treatment of similarly
situated male employees in pure sex discrimination); Guerin, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7501, at *9 (examining treatment of similarly situated white employees in race discrimination case). For the same
reason that a higher standard of proof of the plaintiff's qualifications contravenes the purpose of the
McDonnell Douglas approach, see supra note 208, requiring a plaintiff to prove that she received
treatment different from nonpregnant employees who faced disabilities of comparable nature and duration, to make out a prima facie case, also imposes a very heavy burden on a pregnancy discrimination
plaintiff. See supra note 160. As we argue in this article, we believe that the question of differential
treatment is one that should be raised in the defendant's articulation and pretext stages of the suit, not
at the outset. Another court specifically has found that in pregnancy discrimination cases it is unnecessary to show that a fired pregnant employee was replaced by a nonpregnant person. See Hargett v.
Delta Automotive, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1487, 1493-94 (N.D. Ala. 1991).
210. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Some courts have imposed much more rigid requirements to make out a prima facie case than others. See, e.g., White, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6481,
at *8. (requiring sex discrimination plaintiff to prove that she is a member of a "protected class"; that
"she performed her job satisfactorily"; that "she suffered an adverse employment action"; and that "she
was treated less favorably" than her male counterparts, in order to make out a prima facie case);
Estrada v. Donnelly Corp., 708 F. Supp 834, 836 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (requiring a pregnancy discrimination plaintiff to prove that "she was a member of a protected class, that she was qualified for and
performing the job which she held, and that she was terminated based on her pregnant condition"). But
see Randle, 876 F.2d at 568 (stating that "[t]he initial elements of the prima facie case are relatively
simple to prove"). The imposition of more rigid requirements at this stage of the McDonnell Douglas
analysis defeats the very purpose of this burden shifting approach, which is "designed to assure that
the 'plaintiff [has] his day in court despite the unavailability of direct evidence.' " Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st
Cir. 1979) (alteration in original)).
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case, a rebuttable presumption of discrimination arises.2 ' The burden of
production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision.2 2 If the defendant does
nothing, the plaintiff wins the case."' Once the defendant articulates its
reason, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that
the defendant's articulated reason is pretextual" 4 Upon a finding of pretext, the factfinder is entitled to, but need not, conclude that defendant illegally discriminated.2"5 A conclusion that the defendant discriminated
would, of course, make the defendant liable." 6
In Troupe, the trial judge concluded that there was no direct evidence
of discrimination that would permit the court to employ a mixed motives
analysis.2 7 Therefore, he concluded, the plaintiff must prove her case by
the indirect method set forth in McDonnell Douglas."' He then quickly
dispensed with the case by concluding that the plaintiff had not satisfied
the qualification requirement of a prima facie case 1 9 because Troupe did
not dispute the defendant's evidence that she had a record of tardiness.m
If the McDonnell Douglas test rather than the mixed motives approach
applies, Troupe should have survived summary judgment. She easily established a prima facie case. She proved that she was a member of the
protected class by virtue of her pregnancy; ' she was qualified for the
job because she had been working in the job satisfactorily for almost three
years;'m and she was discharged from the position while other nonpregnant salespersons remained in their positions.'m Once Troupe made out
this prima facie case, the burden of production should have shifted to the
defendant to produce evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for the dis-

211. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03.
212. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
213. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03.
214. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56. For a detailed explanation of the McDonnell Douglas approach
before St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), see McGinley, supra note 205, at part
TB. The St. Mary's Honor Ctr. case changed the approach to the extent that it concluded that the
factfinder could infer discrimination upon a conclusion that the defendant's articulated reason for its
employment decision was pretextual, but was not required to do so. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 113 S. Ct.
at 2749. Liability does not result unless the factfinder concludes that unlawful discrimination indeed
occurred. Id. at 2751-52 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
215. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 113 S. Ct. at 2749.

216. See id. at 2749 & n.4.
217. Troupe v. May Dep't Stores, No. 92-C2605, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7751, at *4-*8 (N.D. Ill.
June 4, 1993).
218. Id. at *8.
219. See supra note 208.
220. Troupe, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7751, at *8.
221. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 736-37.
222. Id.
223. Id. Presumably, defendant Lord & Taylor did not simultaneously discharge its nonpregnant
salespersons along with plaintiff Troupe.
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charge. 4 The defendant satisfied this burden by producing evidence of
Troupe's frequent tardiness."'
At this-point, Troupe produced evidence that the defendant's nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext for discrimination. She submitted evidence that her supervisor's statement that Troupe was fired because the
defendant believed that she did not intend to return to work. 6 Under St.
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, the factfinder is entitled to conclude based
on this evidence of pretext that the defendant fired the plaintiff as a result
of illegal discrimination and not because of lateness. 227 Even without a
showing of any comparative evidence, therefore, the plaintiff would at
least be able to present her case to a factfinder because the factfinder
could infer from the supervisor's statement that the defendant was not
honest in claiming that it fired the plaintiff because of tardiness. Posner
appears to apply a distorted version of this traditional approach. 2 By
refusing to analyze the case under the McDonnell Douglas construct while
at the same time using some, but not all, of the McDonnell Douglas analysis,229 Posner twists the case.
Although Posner's conclusion that Troupe was unable to create a
genuine issue of material fact is clear, his reasoning is not. He stresses
that because of Troupe's tardiness, "she could not show that she met the
employer's requirements for her job"23 and, given her admitted tardiness, she could not prove that the employer's stated reason for firing her
was pretextual. 2 ' By virtue of this reasoning, Posner erred in logic, Title
VII, and summary judgment law. By concluding that Troupe is unable to
prove pretext because she did not deny the defendant's charges that she
was frequently late,232 Posner assumes, on a motion for summary judgment, in light of very strong evidence to the contrary, that Troupe's tardiness is the real (and only) reason for Troupe's dismissal. 3
But evidence to the contrary is provided by the admission of the

224. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; supra text accompanying note 212.
225. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 735.
226. Id. at 735-36.
227. See 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993); supra text accompanying notes 215-16.
228. See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 736-37. In Mason v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank, 704 F.2d 361 (7th
Cir. 1983), Posner explained his aversion to the McDonnell Douglas approach where the person suing
is a managerial employee. See id. at 365. Evidently, he now dislikes the approach for retail sales personnel as well.
229. See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 736-37.
230. Id. at 737.
231. Id.
232. See id.
233. Id. For other examples of courts' crediting the defendant's reason for the discharge on a
motion for summary judgment, see McGinley, supra note 205, at 231-33.
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defendant's employee, Troupe's immediate supervisor, that Lord & Taylor
fired Troupe because her supervisor believed that Troupe would not return
after her maternity leave. 4 In addition, there is the suspicious timing of
Troupe's discharge." 5 Clearly, this evidence is sufficient to raise an issue
of material fact as to the real reason for the plaintiff's discharge. 6
There can be no stronger evidence of the pretextual nature of the
defendant's articulated reason for its actions (plaintiff's tardiness), than an

admission by the defendant itself that its alleged non-discriminatory reason
was not the real reason for the discharge. 7 Furthermore, according to
St. Mary's Honor Center, it is up to the factfinder, not a panel of judges

reviewing a grant of summary judgment, to decide whether defendant
committed illegal discrimination once the plaintiff has presented evidence
that the defendant's non-discriminatory reason for the discharge is a pretextO5

234. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 736.
235. See id. at 735-36, 737.
236. Posner seems to admit this. See id. at 737 ("[tlhis is only an interpretation; and it might appear to be an issue for trial").
237. Posner's avoidance of the facts regarding the true reason for the discharge reminds us of the
arguments made in favor of permitting the use of after-acquired evidence of an employee's wrongdoing as a complete defense to a discrimination suit. See, e.g., Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Tech. Univ.,
975 F.2d 302, 304-05 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 22 (1993). In the after-acquired evidence cases, the defendant is basically saying that its real reason for firing the plaintiff does not matter. See id. at 305 (stating discrimination "becomes irrelevant"). Rather, defendant's argue that at the
time of the firing, there existed a legitimate reason to fire the plaintiff even if it were not the real
reason. See id. at 304-05. Similarly, Posner seems to assume that the real reason for firing Troupe is
irrelevant because there existed at the time of her dismissal some other legitimate reason for firing her.
The Supreme Court recently spoke to this issue in the context of an ADEA case. See
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995). "For purposes of summary
judgment, [the employer] conceded its discrimination.... Id. at 883. Plaintiff, however, had admitted
during discovery that in her last year on the job, she copied and removed confidential documents. Id.
The issue for the Supreme Court was whether the discovery of plaintiff's misconduct after the case
was filed acted as a bar to her recovery, assuming that the employer would have fired the plaintiff for
such misconduct had it been aware of it. Id.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, first paid lip service to the antidiscrimination provisions
and policies underlying both the ADEA and Title VII. See id. at 884-86. Nevertheless, because of the
employee's wrongdoing, the plaintiff was not entitled to reinstatement nor "front pay" which might
otherwise be available under 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988). McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886. She was entitled, however, to calculation by the trial court of her "backpay from the date of the unlawful discharge
to the date the new information was discovered.' Id. This calculation, however, could be modified by
any "extraordinary equitable circumstances that affect the legitimate interests of either party." Id. Cryptically, the Court resolved, "An absolute rule barring any recovery of backpay, however, would undermine the ADEA's objective." Id.
McKennon, then, is vague at best in its guidance to lower courts on the specific issue it addresses. Worse, while making repeated references to Title VII, see, e.g., id. at 884, McKennon is not a
Title VII case. Therefore, it does not address the availability of compensatory and punitive damages in
after-acquired evidence cases which fall under Title VII or the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993). See 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b) (Supp. V 1993).
238. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 113 S. Ct. at 2749. The question is whether any one of us who
drew the discrimination inference and supported Troupe's claim could really be labeled unreasonable.
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Posner went even further. While admitting that the timing of Troupe's
discharge could create a question as to the real motivations of the defendant,239 he forged ahead, intruding upon the factfinding function of trial,
to justify a discharge whose timing made no sense."l Posner recognizes
that it seems nonsensical for Lord & Taylor to fire a pregnant employee
for her past tardiness the day before her maternity leave where the reason
for her tardiness would exist no longer after the leave.24 ' Posner deals
with this troubling discrepancy in Lord & Taylor's story, without referring
to any evidence in the record, by creating out of whole cloth a justification for Lord & Taylor's odd timing. Of course, Posner opines, Lord &
Taylor had to fire Troupe for violating her probationary period in order to
deter other employees from violating probation and flouting company
rules. 42 Said Posner, in dealing with Troupe's case for pretext:
[Troupe's] morning sickness could not interfere with her work
when she was not working because she was on maternity leave,
and it could not interfere with her work when she returned to
work after her maternity leave because her morning sickness
would end at the latest with the birth of her child. Thus her employer fired her one day before the problem that the employer
says caused her to be fired was certain to end. If the discharge of
an unsatisfactory worker were a purely remedial measure rather
than also, or instead, a deterrent one, the inference that Troupe
wasn't really fired because of her tardiness would therefore be a
powerful one. But that is a big "if." We must remember that after
two warnings Troupe had been placed on probation for sixty days
and that she had violated the implicit terms of probation by being
After all, the defendant had kept Troupe on the payroll for about four years, including the six months
prior to her dismissal when she was frequently tardy. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 735. But the defendant did
not fire Troupe after the first time she was late-or the second, or the third. Id. According to Posner's
opinion, the defendant suffered Troupe's tardiness at least 20 times without discharging her. Id. Although Troupe's schedule was changed and she was placed on the 60-day probation, the case report
lacks any other evidence of anything resembling punishment of Troupe. Id. at 735-36. She was accommodated, warned, and nothing more until she was about to claim the fruits of maternity leave. See id.
Then she was fired. Id.
It is of course plausible that the defendant became fed up with Troupe's lateness and simply
did not get around to firing her until the time of the maternity leave. But weighing the competing
scenarios is a task for trial, see St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 113 S. Ct. at 2749, and not that of Posner and
his colleagues, who have enjoyed tenured employment as federal judges and formerly as professors.
See supra note 4. Posner, Easterbrook, and Ripple can be fired essentially only for committing crimes.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. It rings a little hollow for this trio to treat pregnancy-related tardiness as
though it were embezzlement.
239. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 737.
240. See id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
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as tardy during the probationary period as she had been before. If
the company did not fire her, its warnings and threats would seem
empty. Employees would be encouraged to flout work rules knowing that the only sanction would be a toothless warning or a
meaningless period of probation.243
In his academic writings, Posner has advanced arguments for forceful
rules of liability or punishment in order to advance deterrence of undesired
conduct. 2 " But considering the facts in Troupe, deterrence seems an odd
justification for Lord & Taylor's actions. Troupe had for more than three
years been an "entirely satisfactory" employee.245 It was only when
Troupe suffered from a particularly bad case of morning sickness that she
began to arrive late at work, ultimately resulting in her probationary period.' It is difficult to imagine how an employer's ruthlessness could deter morning sickness and its consequent vomiting, mad dashes to the rest
room, dizziness, and exhaustion.24
The deterrence theory Posner posits can only work if Lord & Taylor
can successfully deter other employees from becoming pregnant based on
its treatment of Troupe. Although, according to Posner, such deterrence
would be more efficient, 24 we think it inconsistent with federal anti-discrimination policy and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act itself.
Of course, Posner's supplementation of the record with his reading of
Lord & Taylor's bizarre conduct disregards summary judgment law. In
contravention of the law, Posner does not view the facts in the light most
favorable to Troupe, drawing all reasonable inferences in her behalf. Instead, he supplies a strained rationale that would support the defendant's
version of the facts, hinting that no reasonable factfmder could conclude
otherwise.249 In the next section we explain how Posner artfully uses lan-

243. Id.
244. See, e.g., POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIs, 3d, supra note 7, §§ 7.1-.2; Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1209-14 (1985). Posner has been
particularly fond of arguments for high penalties for illegality in order to deter violations with a minimum investment of enforcement resources. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 3d, supra note 7, § 7.2.
The argument posits that even if the odds of getting caught are low (because of the thin detection and
enforcement mechanisms), potential violators will refrain when faced with high penalties because the
penalties are frightening even when discounted for the low possibility of their occurrence. Id.
245. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 735.

246. Id.
247. See Kay, supra note 163, at 25 & n.137 (outlining likely nonpathological problems in pregnancy).
248. See Posner, Sex Discrimination,supra note 19, at 1332-33 (arguing that a ban on pregnancy
discrimination, or on any other sex-based differentiation in the workplace, is not efficient).
249. See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 737. At trial, facts frequently are more fully developed, even where
the case was well-discovered during pretrial. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, A DistortedMirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, DirectedVerdict, and the Adjudication Pro-
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guage to justify the outcome in Troupe.
B. Troupe's Condescension
The label attached to a person or event often shapes perception of the
thing labeled. For example, the terms "terrorist" and "freedom fighter"
convey wildly different connotations but can be used by political opponents to describe the same people. In a more academic and less partisan
vein, law and literature scholarship has demonstrated how clever writing
can paint protagonists and antagonists in a subtle but powerful light
prompting either favor or disdain in the readerY Like a hypnotized sub-

cess, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 172-78 (1988).
Perhaps Posner's activism in response to the defendant's motion for summary judgment reflects
his previously admitted skepticism about the efficiency of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, as expressed in EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 940-41 (7th Cir. 1988). There Posner noted his skepticism about the utility of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, at least in the context of benefits that are
bargained for by a union:
It is possible that no one was really hurt by the baby bonus plan. The union may have been
trading maternity benefits ... for some other form of benefit... worth more to the employees ... ; in that event there may have been no net discrimination in favor of the female employees, who, as we have just noted, received maternity benefits more generous
than the baby bonuses. But this is not an equitable argument; it is an argument that the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, at least in the context of explicitly bargained-for wages and
fringe benefits, is a gratuitous and perhaps idle interference with labor markets-which it
may be, but that is not our business.
Id.
Posner's activism in Troupe is insidious for another reason. As all Pregnancy Discrimination
Act cases eventually are brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, entitling the parties to a jury
trial, see 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (Supp. V 1993), the holding in Troupe will be a precedent for granting
summary judgment and denying the statutory right to a jury trial. It appears that this result would not
displease Posner. In Pieczynski v. Duffy, 875 F.2d 1331, 1334 (7th Cir. 1989), Posner expressed his
lack of faith in juries:
It would be nice to be able to filter out the phony cases but we have been unable to think
of a good filter beyond what is already provided by pretrial discovery and summary judgment and Rule 11 and directed verdict and remittitur and the other checks on groundless
cases and runaway juries. In the end much will depend on the good sense of juries, and our
faith in the jury is not so great that we can regard this prospect with equanimity.
Id.
250. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Imposition, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1025, 1027-29
(1994); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Scorn, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1061, 1082-90 (1994)
[hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic, Scorn]. See generally JAMES B. WHITE, HERACLES' BOW-ESSAYS
ON THE RHETORIC AND POEnCS OF THE LAW (1985) (discussing rhetorical component of society's
perception of the law); Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989) (discussing the
role of narrative in legal scholarship); Richard Weisberg, How Judges Speak: Some Lessons on Adjudication in Billy Budd, Sailor with an Application to Justice Rehnquist, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 42-58
(1982). Posner has criticized certain law and literature writings at length, particularly Weisberg's interpretation of Billy Budd, but would largely agree with our statement in text. See POSNER, LAW AND
LITERATURE, supra note 7, at 155-66, 269-99 (criticizing Weisberg and then discussing judicial opinions as literature); POSNER, supra note 1, at 33-57 (discussing the prose of Cardozo himself as some-

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol46/iss2/1

38

Stempel: Condescending Contradictions: Richard Posner's Pragmatism and Pre
POSNER AND THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT

ject or a population swooning to propaganda, the reader of a judicial opinion can be induced to form subconscious views about the case and the
litigants that make the result seem just or inevitable notwithstanding the
doctrine enunciated in the case251
Seen in this light, Posner's Troupe opinion is part of the American

judicial tradition,

2

though hardly a tradition worth perpetuating. Posner

has practiced this genre before, but with less subtlety. For example, he has

disparaged prisoner complaints based on his speculation that "[i]nmates
love turning the tables on the prison's staff by hauling it into court. They

like the occasional vacation from prison to testify in court.'' 7s3 Similarly,
Posner has stated that "[i]nstead of reflecting on the wrongs they have
done to society our convicts... prosecute
an endless series of mostly
' 4
imaginary grievances against society. 2
Sometimes, as in these prisoners' rights decisions, derision of the
losing litigant is too vitriolic and becomes a lightning rod for criticism. On
other occasions, Posner's choice of language effectively demonizes the
loser and solidifies the legal result. Posner's Troupe opinion, in its subtle
and artful undermining of the credibility of the plaintiff, is a far cry from
his previous putdowns of prisonersa 55 but remains an effective attempt to
paint Troupe as an unworthy plaintiff. At the outset of the opinion, Posner
notes that Troupe was a part-time employee for three years (1987-90),
converted to full-time status in 1990, and began having her pregnancy-

related problems of illness and tardiness within months after attaining fulltime employment 6 Already, the reader may begin to think of Troupe as
something short of a Horatio Alger character since she is content with

what result-oriented).
251. See Richard Delgado, Mindset and Metaphor, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1872, 1874-75 (1990) (describing a specific use of metaphor and its effect on the reader). See generally Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971 (1991) (discussing role of a narrative based on personal
experience, particularly feminist narrative, in scholarship).
252. See, e.g., PosNER, supra note 1, at 33-57; Delgado & Stefancic, Scorn, supra note 250, at
1063 (judicial rhetoric typically is unduly solicitous of society's powerful litigants and unreasonably
disparaging of litigants with lower socioeconomic status).
253. Merritt v. Faulkner, 823 F.2d 1150, 1157 (7th Cir. 1987).
254. McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1323 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., dissenting).
255. By this, we mean that Posner's Troupe rhetoric does not raise a red flag as to his result-oriented disposition of the case, whereas every intelligent reader could see that Posner disliked prisoners
and their litigation immensely. See supra text accompanying notes 253-54. This is not to say that
Posner's prisoner rhetoric made him unpopular with anyone other than perhaps a few civil libertarians
and academics, since most of society and the legal establishment probably wish prisoners would simply go away. During the Reagan and Bush Administrations, Posner's anti-prisoner rhetoric may have
even helped his prospects for the Supreme Court, see Ranli, supra note- 3, at 1, 26, just as Warren
Burger's speeches against criminal defendants' rights helped him become Chief Justice. See WooDWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 4, at 12.
256. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 735.
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protracted part-time employment. When affected by pregnancy, she quickly reverts to part-time status,"' signaling perhaps that she does not have
the requisite commitment to full-time work, certainly not when faced with
any adversity.
In case we had any doubt, Posner makes Troupe's unworthiness more
apparent in the next few sentences when he notes that Troupe continued to
be bothered by morning sickness despite working a noon to 5 p.m. shift
"[p]artly it seems because she slept later under the new schedule, so that
noon was 'morning' for her."" 5 Thus, Posner, who has obviously never
been pregnant and is not a medical doctor, z" simply presumes that anyone troubled by morning sickness at noon must have been slothfully sleeping the morning away, enjoying the fruits of her conversion to part-time
status." ° The reader begins to see Troupe as lazy and, although perhaps
adequate to the task prior to pregnancy,261 as the sort of employee who
could not handle adversity sufficiently to remain "qualified" for the job
when pregnant,262 at least not within Posner's construction of Title VII.
In the same sentence, Posner questions Troupe's candor and that of
her lawyer by noting that he has described Troupe's job problems "with
understatement as 'slight' or 'occasional' tardiness." '63 The rest of the
opinion and the record in the case fail to establish that Troupe's tardiness
was really a serious impediment to her work.264 Posner paints the lateness problem as quite severe, noting with delphic authority that for a onemonth period, Troupe "reported late to work, or left early, on nine out of
the 21 working days 216 and that she was "tardy three days in a row late
in March"" 6 and "late eleven more days" during her probationary

257. Id.
258. Id.
259. SEARCH OF WESTLAW, WLD-JUDGE database (Jan. 15, 1995).
260. To be fair to Posner, we note that there is some support in the record for a portion of what he
implies. Troupe's physician recommended that, in addition to adopting a different diet regime, she rise
earlier as part of an effort to minimize the morning sickness. See Aff. of Mary K. Palmore, M.D., Mar.
5, 1993 (Pl.'s Ex. B in Opp'n to Summ. J., Troupe app. at A-41). Troupe's doctor did not, however,
suggest that simply making "morning" earlier would eliminate Troupe's illness. See id.
261. See Posner, Sex Discrimination,supra note 19, at 1328 n.38. Posner states:
Rarely will an employer fire, or otherwise treat badly, a perfect worker, of whatever race or
sex. Discrimination is more apt to be directed against workers who are not, or not much,
better than average, and whose complaint is that the employer took a dimmer view of their
failings than he would have of a white male's failings.
Id.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

See supra note 208 and text accompanying notes 217-20, 230.
Troupe, 20 F.3d at 735.
See supra notes 230-38 and accompanying text.
Troupe, 20 F.3d at 735.
Id.
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period. 7 Posner invites the reader to follow him in putting the worst
spin on Troupe's lateness.
Posner also notes Troupe's supervisor by name, thus indicating that
the supervisor is a woman. This introduction of an unnecessary fact
suggests to the reader that Troupe was not being judged (at least not at
close range) by some cigar-chomping white male retailing tycoon but by
another woman. The implication is that Troupe was probably treated with
some sensitivity and given a chance to make good. 69 Posner further
paints the picture of a benevolent Lord & Taylor in his overall description." Having failed such a reasonable employer, Troupe is implicitly
characterized as unworthy. Although Posner later hitches the case decision
primarily to his legal view of Title VII that employers have something of
a license to be mean,"1 his earlier spin on the facts invites the reader to
relax and not be too greatly troubled by the harshness of his broad immunity for employers. The subliminal message posits that Troupe was given
a fair shake by a decent employer. If only she had stopped sleeping until
noon and gotten herself to work on time she would have had her maternity
leave and a job when she returned from leave. Posner invites readers to
blame Troupe for the problem.
Posner's repeated references to the paucity of the record and the thin
reed upon which Troupe's lawyer has hung the case272 are more justifiable content for a judicial opinion. We operate, after all, in an adversary
system, and to a large extent litigants suffer for the mistakes of their lawyers 3 Consequently, a court is to some extent led to its conclusions by

267. Id.
268. Id.
269. The record in the case suggests quite the opposite. In a "verbal counseling" record form dated
Feb. 18, 1991, supervisor Jennifer Rauch states that she warned Troupe about tardiness but that, in her
view, Troupe had "no excuses." Lord & Taylor Record of Interview completed by Jennifer Rauch,
Feb. 18, 1991 (Pl.'s Ex. G in Opp'n to Summ. J., Troupe app. at A-45). Rauch records Troupe as late
"9 out of 21 days" but states that "2 of those days she was ill" Id. Rauch's presentation of the "facts"
thus differs dramatically from those of Troupe (and her physician) and suggests more than a little
insensitivity or hostility toward Troupe's pregnancy in that Rauch apparently did not consider morning
sickness a legitimate illness, nor an excuse for lateness. See id.
270. See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 735-36. Posner notes that the defendant permitted Troupe to switch
from full-time to part-time to meet her needs. Id. at 735. He cited the store's tolerance for her tardiness, see supra notes 265-67 and accompanying text, and its generous maternity leave policy, Troupe,
20 F.3d at 736.
271. See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738-39 (holding that Lord & Taylor could indeed dismiss Troupe for
her pregnancy absence as long as a male employee would be fired for a comparable absence).
272. See id. at 737 (stating Troupe has only "two facts to offer" against the inference that tardiness
led to her dismissal). Furthermore, she did not meet the evidentiary burden announced by Posner in
this opinion. Id. at 738-39; see supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
273. See, e.g., Corchado v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc., 665 F.2d 410, 413 (1st Cir.
1981) (stating adversary system necessarily implies that clients will be bound by their attorneys' errors), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982). See generally BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL,
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the work of the lawyers. If Troupe's lawyer led her case to defeat, as the
case suggests, this is not the fault of the courts. But, of course, even in the
adversary system, courts are not rigidly bound to characterize the case in
the manner presented by counsel, particularly where counsel may have
miscalculated.274 Indeed, Posner himself has frequently recast attorneys'
arguments into the form he believes is most conducive to rendering an
optimal ruling on the case and discussion of the legal issue in
question.27 s In Troupe, however, Posner implies failings of her counsel to
facilitate the grant of summary judgment.276 Consequently, Posner in
Troupe embraces "bare bones" adversarialism and inaccurately suggests
that he is constrained to decide Troupe as he did because of the way her
lawyer served up the case.
This presentation serves both to make Posner look less result oriented277 and also buttresses the earlier rhetoric suggesting that Troupe is unworthy of the legal system's aid. Because her lawyer has bungled, she has
bungled. Perhaps a better lawyer was unwilling to take the case. Posner
the academic has suggested quite bluntly (and probably erroneously)278
that the market for legal services screens the quality of cases according to
an attorney's willingness to take them.279 If a case cannot attract a good
attorney, he reasons, it must not be a very good case."' By tarring her

FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW-AN INTERDISCIPLINARY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER 103-28 (1994)

(describing the adversary system of dispute resolution that prevails in the United States court system).
274. See Mirjan Damaka, Structures of Authority and ComparativeCriminal Procedure, 84 YALE
L.J. 480, 524-26 (1975) (arguing, in the criminal context, that American judges have control over the
manner in which a case is presented and the result, despite not being the ostensible developers of facts
and legal arguments in the case).
275. See, e.g., Harbor Ins. Co. v. Continental Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357, 362-65 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Posner, J.) (explaining a doctrine which attorneys themselves could not explain); American Nurses'
Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 726 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) (redefining "willful" for plaintiff).
Indeed, attorneys and judges have criticized Posner for interpreting and evaluating arguments in his
own terms. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 2, at 76-77.
276. See supra note 263 and text accompanying notes 263, 272.
277. By our definition, not Posner's. See infra notes 463-71 and accompanying text.
278. See Russell G. Pearce et al., Project, An Assessment of Alternative Strategiesfor Increasing
Access to Legal Services, 90 YALE L.J. 122, 143-44 (1980) (suggesting that factors other than merit of
claims are critical in determining whether attorneys participate).
279. See, e.g., McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1324-25 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., dissenting)
(making this argument in the context of prisoners' rights suits).
280. See, e.g., Hughes v. Joliet Correctional Ctr., 931 F.2d 425, 429-30 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner,
J.); McKeever, 689 F.2d at 1324-25 (Posner, J., dissenting). This argument ignores the obvious market
glitches involving delivery of legal services. See Brown, supra note 15, at 1138-53.
These market imperfections are not peculiar to prisoner's cases. See id. at 1145-46. Because an
inexperienced or unsophisticated consumer, perhaps like Troupe, could have difficulty differentiating
lawyers according to quality, there is little likelihood that she ever attempted to attract a star lawyer to
her case. Further, even an outstanding case of liability may involve a low amount of damages, making
star lawyers unlikely to be interested or unlikely to expend significant effort on a typical worker's
discrimination claim. See id. at 1145. Posner himself admits that the "stakes are small" for the typical
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lawyer, Posner implicitly tars Troupe.
C. Disregardingthe Purpose of the Pregnancy
DiscriminationAct
Perhaps the most damning criticism of Posner's Troupe opinion is that
it ignored the history and purpose of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
contradicting Posner's own philosophy of the judicial role in statutory
interpretation."8 Posner's opinion in Troupe is particularly troubling given his awareness of the peculiar history of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act.8 2 As mentioned earlier, the Act was passed in 1978 for the express
purpose of overruling General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 3 which, in an
opinion by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, held that discrimination
against women based on pregnancy was not gender discrimination under
Title VIIL
The Gilbert plaintiffs were hourly employees of a General Electric
plant in Salem, Virginia." As such, they were entitled to coverage under the company's disability insurance plan, which provided that totally
disabled employees could collect up to sixty percent of their average
weekly wages for up to twenty-six weeks. 6 However, disability resulting from pregnancy-childbirth, miscarriage, morning sickness, or other
pregnancy-related illness-was not covered. 7 The plaintiffs alleged gender discrimination in violation of Title VII and prevailed in the district
court" s and before a divided Fourth Circuit panl. 9 By a 6-3 vote,2'
the Supreme Court reversede 29' in a majority opinion authored by Justice
Rehnquist.2

plaintiff in a disparate treatment gender discrimination case. See Posner, Sex Discrimination, supra
note 19, at 1328. Consequently, even cases of clear discrimination may not attract lawyers.
Posner seems to hint that these cases should not be brought, see id. at 1328-29, 1334-35, but
we differ, these are exactly the sorts of cases that need to be brought to prevent employers from engaging in routine discrimination against women, minorities, and older workers in low-paying jobs.
281. See supra text and notes 68-90.
282. See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 735.
283. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
284. Id. at 136-46.
285. Id. at 128-29.
286. Id. at 128.
287. Id. at 129. The named plaintiffs in this class action case tested the concreteness of the
company's interpretation of the policy by filing disability claims for the periods in which they were
absent from work because of pregnancy. Id. at 128-29. GE denied the claims. Id. at 129.
288. Id. at 130.
289. Id. at 132.
290. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented. Id. at 146 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at
160 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
291. Id. at 146.
292. Id. at 127. Joining Justice Rehnquist in the majority vote to absolve the defendant of Title
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Justice Rehnquist's rationale for finding no gender discrimination is
troubling. Justice Rehnquist concluded that an employee benefit plan excluding pregnancy benefits was not discriminatory because the exclusion
deprived both men and some women of pregnancy disability benefits and
thus treated male and female employees alike in its exclusion.293 Justice
Rehnquist was forced to acknowledge, of course, that men do not get
294
pregnant, but found this biological truth irrelevant to the legal inquiry.
Because the exclusion was facially neutral (i.e., a male employee could
apply for pregnancy disability and also be denied), Justice Rehnquist
found no per se gender discrimination.2" His review of the record and
the plaintiff's theory of the case also suggested that the exclusion in the
policy was not the result of intentional discrimination directed at female
employees.2
Although acknowledging that Title VII barred discriminatory effects as
well as intentional discrimination,297 Justice Rehnquist found dismissal of
the plaintiffs' claim appropriate because "there is no proof that the
[employees' disability leave] package is in fact worth more to men than to
women," making it "impossible to find any gender-based discriminatory
effect in this scheme simply because women disabled as a result of pregnancy do not receive benefits. '9 8 Justice Rehnquist reproduced some data on disability payments under the plan to suggest that women workers
on average received more benefits under the disability plan than did their
male co-workers. 2 9
Justice Brennan dissented, with Justice Marshall joining."° Justice

VII liability were Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, and Powell.
Justices Stewart and Blackmun concurred specially to note that the limited scope of the majority opinion should not be read to undermine Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (establishing
disparate impact theory of Title VII liability). Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 146 (Stewart, J., concurring); id.
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part). However, neither of the concurring Justices questioned the reasoning of the Gilbert majority. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring); id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).
293. Gilbert,429 U.S. at 134-35.
294. Id. at 135 (citing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974)).
295. Id. at 134-35 (citing Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97).
296. See id. at 136-37. It also appears that the plaintiffs made no serious effort to suggest that GE
chose its particular disability insurance plan with the intent of targeting women for exclusion. Of
course, an employer, particularly one with a significant female workforce of childbearing age, might
be quite conscious of the opportunity to reduce benefits claimed and collected by women by procuring
disability insurance that excludes pregnancy coverage. Proving this sort of intentional discrimination
would likely be quite difficult, however, since this illegal goal, if ever discussed, would likely be
raised in undocumented conversations between (male) executives and insurance brokers.
297. See id. at 136-38; see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-32 (1971) (creating
the Title VII disparate impact cause of action).
298. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138.
299. Id. at 130 n.9.
300. Id. at 146 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Stevens filed a separate dissent."' Justice Brennan refuted the Court's
conclusion that the General Electric Disability Plan was sex-neutral."°
He argued that the policy's coverage of all disabilities that were mutual to
both sexes was not enough. 3" He noted that the disability policy favored
men by covering all male reproductive procedures such as prostatectomies,
vasectomies, and circumcisions, whereas it covered only some of the female reproductive disabilities and singularly excluded the most prevalent
cause of reproductive disabilities for females: pregnancy.3"
Justice Stevens's dissent argued that denying disability coverage related to pregnancy violated Title VII because it "places the risk of absence
caused by pregnancy in a class by itself."3 5"
By definition, such a rule discriminates on account of sex; for it is
the capacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates the
female from the male. The analysis is the same whether the rule
relates to hiring, promotion, the acceptability of an excuse for
absence, or an exclusion from a disability insurance plan. Accordingly... I conclude that the language of the statute plainly requires the result which the Courts of Appeals have reached unanimously. "°
In a rapid response to Gilbert, Congress amended Title VII, passing
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act."° Title VII had already made it unlawful for an employer to discharge or discriminate against an individual
with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" because of the individual's sex.0 The Pregnancy Discrimination
Act amended the "Definitions" section of Title VII to make it clear that
discrimination based on pregnancy was discrimination based on sex in
violation of Title VII? ° The amendment states in relevant part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on
are not limited to, because of or on
birth, or related medical'conditions;
nancy, childbirth, or related medical
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

the basis of sex" include, but
the basis of pregnancy, childand women affected by pregconditions shall be treated the

Id. at 160 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 152-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 152 (Brennan, L, dissenting).
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 161 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 161-62 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076, 2076-77 (1978) (codi-

fied at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988)).
308. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
309. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 92 Stat. at 2076.
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same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of
benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work .... "'
The legislative history of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act makes
clear that Congress believed that the original Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibited discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions.31' The House Report of the Education and Labor Committee specifically notes that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) had, years before Gilbert, issued guidelines requiring employers to treat disabilities caused by pregnancy as they do any other
disability.3 12 The House Report further states that before the Gilbert decision, eighteen federal district courts and all seven United States Courts of
Appeals that had dealt with the issue had prohibited discrimination based
on pregnancy, in accordance with the EEOC guidelines.313 The House
Report concludes that Congress, in enacting Title VII, had mandated
"equal access to employment and its concomitant benefits for female and
' The House Report criticized the "Supreme Court's narmale workers."314
row interpretations of Title VII [as] tend[ing] to erode our national policy
of nondiscrimination in employment [leaving us] in a state of national
' Rather,
confusion and with inconsistent practices from State to State."315
the House Report explicitly adopts the arguments made by Justices
Brennan and Stevens in their dissents.3 6
This explicit adoption of the Brennan and Stevens dissents demonstrates that the Act not only overturned Gilbert, but also had a broader
purpose, as was acknowledged by the Court in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC," a 7-2 opinion which left Justice
Rehnquist continuing his defense of Gilbert."' Newport News, authored

310. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
311. See H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4749, 4750-52.
312. Id. at 4750.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 4751.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 4750.
317. 462 U.S. 669 (1983). Newport News held that an insurance plan that gave less generous pregnancy coverage to the wives of male employees than it gave to women employees violated the 1978
Act. Id. at 682-84.
318. See id. at 685 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As is so frequently the case, a Justice Rehnquist
opinion can read persuasively but perhaps takes undue liberties in the presentation of the facts and
law. See id. at 680 n.20 (majority opinion implying that Justice Rehnquist has presented a distorted
picture of a colloquy between Senators Williams (D-N.J.) and Hatch (R-Utah) in order to unfairly buttress his claim that majority has extended 1978 Act beyond legislative intent); WOODWARD &
ARMSTRONG, supra note 4, at 383-84 (describing how Justice Brennan concluded that Justice
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by Justice Stevens, read the 1978 Act as not only overruling Gilbert and
expanding the reach of Title VII's prohibition of pregnancy discrimination,319 but also approving the statutory interpretation approach of the
Gilbert dissenters."
This interpretation would require the courts to examine the broad
purposes of Title VII law in eliminating sex discrimination in interpreting
" ' According to the House Report, the
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.32
stereotypical assumption that women who become pregnant will leave the
labor force has caused the view that women are "marginal" workers.3"
This view "is at the root of the discriminatory practices which keep wom'
en in low-paying and dead-end jobs. '""e
The Report stated:
Although recent attention has been focused on the coverage of
disability benefits programs, the consequences of other discriminatory employment policies on pregnant women and women in general has historically had a persistent and harmful effect upon their
careers. Women are still subject to the stereotype that all women
are marginal workers. Until a woman passes the child-bearing age,
she is viewed by employers as potentially pregnant. Therefore, the
elimination of discrimination based on pregnancy in these employment practices in addition to disability and medical benefits will
go a long way toward providing equal employment opportunities
for women, the goal of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.324
To correct this problem, the legislation applies broadly to all aspects of
employment, including hiring, reinstatement, termination, disability benefits, sick leave, medical benefits, seniority and other conditions of employment covered by Title VII"
The Report from the Senate Committee on Human Resources" echoes the House Report, stating that the Gilbert decision "threatens to underRehnquist misquoted precedent deceptively to try to alter the substantive law in a way not contemplated by the Justices in conference).
319. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 676-81.

320. Id. at 679 & n.17.
321.
Guerra,
permits
purpose
322.
4751.

See Feinberg, supra note 163, at 143-44; accord California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
479 U.S. 272, 284-92 (1987) (reading Pregnancy Discrimination Act expansively, finding it
states to require maternity leave benefits, given the Pregnancy Discrimination Act's original
of protecting pregnant women from employment discrimination).
H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749,

323. Id.
324. Id. at 4754-55.

325. Id. at 4755.
326. S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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mine the central purpose of the sex discrimination prohibitions of [T]itle
VII." 3"' It goes on to report that the testimony before the Senate Committee demonstrated that
the assumption that women will become pregnant and leave the
labor market is at the core of the sex stereotyping resulting in
unfavorable disparate treatment of women in the workplace. A
failure to address discrimination based on pregnancy, in fringe
benefits or in any other employment practice, would prevent the
elimination of sex discrimination in employment." 8
Contrary to the explicit purpose of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act-to protect women of child-bearing age from marginalization in the
workplace by expanding the employment rights of women and by defeating stigmatizing stereotypes-Posner contracts the substantive rights of
women in Troupe, relying on the very same stereotypes the legislature
sought to condemn." 9 In so doing, Posner authors a decision that demonstrates an eerie similarity to Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Gilbert. It is
far less excusable, however, given Posner's awareness of the history of
Gilbert and of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.3
In deciding that discharge of a pregnant employee on the verge of
maternity leave in order to save a few dollars does not violate the modem,
"
' Posner in Troupe resurrects then-Juspost-Gilbert, amended Title VII,33
tice Rehnquist's narrow methods of statutory interpretation. In effect,
Posner has chosen Justice Rehnquist's Gilbert formalism over the
functionalism of Newport News.33 By a functional interpretative approach, we mean one that seeks to give effect to the intended function of
the statute so long as that application is not clearly precluded by the law's
text or specific congressional intent and would not unfairly upset or penalize the settled expectations of the parties. What we describe as a functional approach is, ironically, similar to what Posner has termed a pragmatic
or practical reason approach to statutory interpretation, an approach to
which he claims to subscribe.333 It is clear from the legislative history of
327. Id. at 3.
328. Id.
329. See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 737-39 (holding that a termination motivated by the employer's expectation that a pregnant employee will not return to work is not illegal discrimination).
330. See id. at 735.
331. See id. at 737-39.
332. Compare supra notes 317-21 and accompanying text (discussing Newport News) with supra
notes 283-99 and accompanying text (discussing Gilbert).
333. See Posner, A Primer, supra note 6, at 448, 449-50. For additional reading, see also Eskridge
& Frickey, supranote 67, at 345-62, describing an essentially functional approach to statutory application, but labeling it as "practical reasoning." This contradiction between theorist Posner and jurist
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the Pregnancy Discrimination Act that the obvious functional goal of
Congress in enacting Title VIl's ban on gender (and pregnancy) discrimination was to equalize employment opportunities for women by creating

civil liability when employers discriminate against women based on illegitimate stereotypes of the role women play." 4

Posner's opinion in Troupe fails to achieve this functional goal. In
fact, it belittles this goal by appearing to give full force to the plain meaning and intent of the Act, while at the same time avoiding the use of established evidentiary constructs, 3 5 finding facts in favor of the defendant
on a motion for summary judgment and permitting the illegal use of stigmatizing stereotypes to justify the defendant's actions.336
Gilbert stands as an embarrassment to the Supreme Court and Justice
Rehnquist because it so badly misconstrued a relatively recent statute with
a broad, seemingly applicable text backed by other indicia of congressional intent, circuit court decisions, and the views of the administrative
agency charged with enforcing the statute.337 In retrospect, it is thus not
surprising that Congress reversed Gilbert in relatively short order.33' The
Court erred so badly in large part because it spumed a functional approach
to Title VII. In Gilbert, Justice Rehnquist cannot claim to have merely
adopted a textual approach339 to interpreting the law, which he frequently

Posner is explored later. See infra notes 429-73 and accompanying text. Although Posner distinguishes
pragmatism and practical reason (arriving at an acceptable resolution of a case or problem based on an
eclectic mix of inquiry), see PosNER, JuRISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 26-27 & n.41, we commingle
the two concepts as we believe Posner does as well (in both cases and scholarly writing). When applied fairly and intelligently, the two approaches are nearly synonymous in that they both counsel a
functional approach to statutory interpretation and case adjudication. Accord Van Zandt, supranote 89,
at 788-89, 791-831 (mingling the terms, finding that common sense is an important part of judicial
decisionmaking, but finding that judges and scholars promoting pragmatic practical reason overstate
the objectivity and correctness of their views as to what constitutes common sense).
334. See supra notes 311-16 and accompanying text; accord supra note 133 and accompanying
text (discussing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 228).
335. See supra parts lIH.A.1, III.A.3.
336. See supra part III.A.2.
337. See supra notes 311-16 and accompanying text.
338. See supra note 307 and accompanying text. Notwithstanding this rebuke by the popularly
elected legislative branch, Justice Rehnquist and his conservative allies continued to fight against a
functional approach to interpreting civil rights laws, prompting further corrective legislation. See
Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Rehnquist Court, Statutory Interpretation,Inertial Burdens, and a Misleading
Version of Democracy, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 583, 673-74 (1991).
339. By textualism, we mean the method of statutory construction that seeks to discern the law's
meaning according to the text of the statute alone, minimizing resort to extrinsic sources of information such as congressional proceedings, the circumstances prompting the enactment, or the purpose of
the statute. See generally Redish & Chung, supra note 51 (reviewing major approaches to statutory
interpretation); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990) (describing modem plain meaning school of thought, most associated with Justice Scalia, as contrasted to
earlier versions of textualist approach that were more admitting of extrinsic material as aids to interpretation).
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endorses," but instead adopted a hyper-literal view of Title VIl's text
that an employer may not "discriminate against any individual with respect
to ...employment, because of ...sex. 341 To be sure, disability benefits are part of employment compensation and privileges. However, the
Gilbert Court saw no discrimination because the employer's denial of
benefits was ostensibly based on the condition of pregnancy rather than
gender 42 even though the two are inextricably linked. As Justice
Stevens' dissent demonstrates, the text of Title VII does not compel this
simultaneously narrow yet strained reading adopted by the Court majority.343 It is simply the Rehnquist faction's favored way to read the text. 344
Posner acknowledges awareness of this historical background,
which makes the Troupe opinion all the more puzzling and indefensible.
In fact, five years earlier in UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,345 Posner
interpreted the "Bona Fide Occupational Qualification" (BFOQ),3" defense narrowly, an interpretation that is inconsistent with his free market
views, but consistent with the purpose of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act. In Johnson Controls, the plaintiffs, fertile women, were excluded
from jobs relating to the production of batteries for the purpose of protecting their potential fetuses from lead poisoning should they become pregnant.3 47 The Seventh Circuit concluded that the restriction was justified
by the defendant's business necessity."
Posner dissented, arguing first that "business necessity" was not the
proper defense because the case presented a question of intentional, overt
discrimination against fertile women, a class that is protected by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.349 Second, Posner argued that the BFOQ defense cannot be interpreted to permit employers to treat fertile women
differently based on the employer's cost of accomodating fertile (and
pregnant) women. 5 Posner concluded that an employers' accommoda-

340. See, e.g., Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1991) (holding for unanimous
Court that the prisoner subpoenaed as a witness is entitled to compensation under the federal witness
fee statute), overruled by Incarcerated Witness Fees Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-417, § 2, 106 Stat.
2138 (1992), 28 U.S.C. § 1821(f) (Supp. V 1993); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564,
575-77 (1982) (holding for 7-2 majority that damages provisions of 46 U.S.C. § 596 (1982) require an
unsuccessful defendant to pay double daily wages to the prevailing seaman plaintiff for each day unpaid, no matter what length of litigation precedes the fixing of liability).
341. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 133 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976)).
342. Id. at 134-35 (citing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494, 496-97 (1974)).
343. See id. at 160-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
344. See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 735.
345. 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
346. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1988).
347. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 875-76.
348. Id. at 898.
349. Id. at 904 (Posner, J., dissenting).
350. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol46/iss2/1

50

Stempel: Condescending Contradictions: Richard Posner's Pragmatism and Pre
POSNER AND THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT

tion of pregnant employees is not a rational choice because it will always
cost an employer more to accommodate a pregnant employee. Therefore,
Posner concluded, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act would be meaningless if it were to permit a broad cost justification defense.35 '
Thus, in Johnson Controls, Posner the judge did not accede to his
personal preference for market theory in interpreting the Act. Instead, he
interpreted the statute in light of its purpose-to protect pregnant women
(and those who could become pregnant) from-job discrimination. It is
unclear why Posner roamed from this position in Troupe.
Although one would assume that the lessons of Johnson Controls,
Gilbert, and the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act would prompt him to
avoid a hyper-literal reading of Title VII, in Troupe Posner repeats and expands upon Justice Rehnquist's errors. To be fair, Posner would distingnish Gilbert by arguing that the law requires only that employers treat
pregnant and nonpregnant employees alike.352 In Gilbert, GE treated its
female employees differently from the men by not granting disability
benefits to all of the women's reproductive disabilities while simultaneously granting disability benefits to men for all of their reproductive disabilities.353 In Troupe, Posner would say, the plaintiff did not prove that the
defendant would have treated differently a male employee about to embark
on a medical leave. 4 But the basic assumption alone that it is not a violation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to fire an employee because
she is about to go on maternity leave is questionable considering the legislative purpose of the Act and the history of its enactment. Pregnancy and
maternity leave are so inextricably linked that they may be impossible to
separate for purposes of discrimination law, just as pregnancy and gender
are so inextricably linked, as Justice Rehnquist discovered.
We are not criticizing Posner's view that the Act demands only equal,
and not preferential treatment for pregnant women. There is a substantial
basis in the legislative history for this conclusion.355 Moreover, the text
of the Act is not crystal clear. And the Supreme Court has not yet decided
the issue of whether the Act requires preferential or merely equal treatment of pregnant employees. CaliforniaFederalSavings & Loan Ass'n v.

351. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
352. See id. at 738-39.
353. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 152-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
354. See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738-39.
355. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 948, at 4752. Many of the courts interpreting the Act have interpreted it to require equal, and not preferential, treatment. A pregnant teacher, for example, could not prevail in a Pregnancy Discrimination suit if she "did not lack any benefit available to other teachers."
EEOC v. Elgin Teachers Ass'n, 27 F.3d 292, 296 (7th Cir. 1994). There is a good argument, however,
that providing an equal employment opportunity to women may require some preferential treatment.
See Kay, supra note 163, at 30-31; Feinberg, supra note 163, at 145-46.
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356 which held that
Guerra,
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act did not preempt a California law that gave preferential treatment to pregnant employees taking disability leave,357 left open the question whether the Act requires preferential treatment of pregnant employees.
The confusion as to whether the Act requires preferential treatment of
pregnant employees stems from two clauses of the Act that are apparently
contradictory.358 The first clause in question states: "The terms 'because
of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to, because of
or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. . . .""' Standing alone, this clause appears to be an absolute prohibition against all adverse actions taken against employees because of pregnancy, potentially requiring an employer to grant a pregnant employee
preferential treatment. For example, it would likely prevent employers
from discharging employees who are too disabled to work due to their
pregnancies, even though employers would discharge similarly situated,
nonpregnant employees.3W6
The second clause in question states:

[W]omen affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability
or inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2h of this title
shall be interpreted to permit otherwise.36'
This clause has a number of potential interpretations. One could read it as
simply overruling Gilbert, limiting the first clause to the specific examples
given. This interpretation is an unduly narrow reading of the Act, which
Newport News subsequently rejected. 62 Or, the second clause could conceivably limit the first clause by prohibiting preferential treatment of preg363
nant employees. The Court rejected this interpretation in Guerra,
rightfully so in light of the legislative history and purpose of the Act.
Another possible interpretation is that the second clause limits the first
clause, requiring that pregnant employees shall be treated equally to, and
not necessarily better than, other similarly situated nonpregnant employ-

356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

479 U.S. 272 (1987).
Id. at 292.
See Feinberg, supra note 163, at 143-46.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
See Feinberg, supra note 163, at 143-46.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
See supra notes 317-20 and accompanying text.
Guerra, 479 U.S. at 285.
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ees.3" Or, finally, the second clause could be read independently of the
first clause, simply overruling the result in Gilbert, but not limiting, illustrating, or interpreting the first clause. Under this interpretation, the Act
would likely require preferential treatment of pregnant employees.
Given these possible interpretations, we would not condemn Posner
for selecting the more conservative interpretation. We do criticize, however, the formalistic conclusion that firing a woman based on a stereotypical
assumption that she will not return to work after pregnancy leave is not a
violation of the Act. 6 We also criticize the manner in which Posner approached the subject, a manner that suggests insufficient regard for Congress and the Act.3" This disregard is inconsistent with Posner's professed views on statutory interpretation.

IV. SITING TROUPE ON THE

POSNERIAN LEGAL LANDSCAPE

A. Posner on Gender Discrimination
Close examination of Troupe and Posner's statements regarding employment discrimination suggests that Title VII litigation remains an area
where despite ostensible commitment to neutral judging, Posner remains a
prisoner of personal preferences. As noted before, Posner has orally belittled job discrimination claims 367 and in his written opinions and articles
made similar criticisms of this genre of cases and the body politic's allegedly misplaced concern for them.368 His criticism is not that discrimination laws were not legitimately passed by Congress or that they do not
enjoy a philosophical, moral, political, and social base. Rather, Posner
attacks gender discrimination laws (indeed, all discrimination laws, but
gender more than others), because they are inefficient.369
Posner's most recent scholarly assault on gender discrimination laws
appears in the current edition of Economic Analysis of Law37° and essentially restates arguments he has made primarily in law review articles

364. This is the interpretation that Posner gives the law, an interpretation that, although inconsistent with our own views of what the Pregnancy Discrimination Act should be, is probably the most
accepted interpretation of the Act. Thus, we do not criticize Posner for this interpretation.
365. See supra notes 168-201 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 311-34.
367. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
368. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 20, at 2216 (referring to age discrimination laws as "sacred
cows"); Bush v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 990 F.2d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 1993) (criticizing the
plaintiff's lateness and absences), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1648 (1994); Harrington v. Aetna-Bearing
Co., 921 F.2d 717, 721 (7th Cir.) (stating that the ADEA does not "provide older employees with job
security'), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 906 (1991).
369. See, e.g., PosNER, ECONOMIC ANALYStS, 4th, supra note 7, § 11.7.
370. Id.
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published in 1987... and 1989.372 The 1989 article373 presents
Posner's most extensive discussion of gender discrimination and employment. Although in his other writings during this period, Posner was,
according to his own account, moving away from narrow economic analysis of legal questions,37 4 wealth-maximization continues to be Posner's
mantra for meditating on discrimination law.
In making this assessment, we are perhaps less than generous.
Posner's 1989 article was expressly labeled an economic analysis375 so it
is unsurprising that his discussion of gender discrimination is economic.
However, in that article, his treatise, and other writings, Posner not only
focuses on economic analysis but also tends to disregard or minimize
other issues one would expect to find in a reasonably comprehensive discussion of gender discrimination law.376 In his other economically oriented writings reaching controversial conclusions, Posner frequently acknowledges noneconomic aspects of the topic that might justify a different
conclusion.377 Although Posner is aware of these issues and at least alludes to them when discussing race discrimination law,378 when addressing gender discrimination law, he seems to delight in keeping his analytic
focus narrow.379 As Posner assigns weights to the variables of his economic model of gender discrimination, economic analysis suggests to him
that such laws are unwise, unnecessary, and perhaps counterproduc380
tive.
371. See Posner, Efficiency and Efficacy, supra note 19, at 514.
372. See Posner, Sex Discrimination,supra note 19, at 1334-35.
373. Technically, the piece is an "exchange" with Northwestern University Law Professor John J.
Donohue, Il. See Donohue, ProhibitingSex Discrimination,supra note 19, at 1340 (refuting Posner in
economic terms). Posner's earlier article attacking Title VII as generally inefficient also was spurred
by Donohue. See Posner, Efficiency and Efficacy, supra note 19, at 513 (responding to Donohue, Title
VII, supra note 19). Although Posner's 1989 Chicago piece is comparatively short, it provides his
most sustained examination of the law and policy of gender discrimination in employment and has
been ratified by his more recent writings, particularly the Fourth Edition of Economic Analysis of Law.
See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 4th, supra note 7, § 11.7. Consequently, our discussion will focus
on the 1989 article. See Posner, Sex Discrimination,supra note 19.
374. See supra part II.
375. See Posner, Sex Discrimination,supra note 19, at 1311.
376. See, e.g., POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 3d, supra note 7, §1 1.7, at 313-14 (acknowledging
with seven words that "exploitative discrimination" is one explanation for wage discrimination against
females); Posner, Sex Discrimination,supra note 19, at 1311-12 (failing to acknowledge intentional
sex discrimination as anything but a product of economic forces in his introduction).
377. See, e.g., POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 3d, supra note 7, § 5.4, at 141 (discussing adoption
as an economic matter and noting that some may recoil at his suggestion of selling babies as a means
of improving child placement).
378. See, e.g., Posner, Efficiency and Efficacy, supra note 19, at 521 (acknowledging morality of
racial equality as a justification for Title VII). When addressing gender discrimination, Posner notes
only in passing the presence of "-it goes without saying-an enormous legal literature on sex discrimination law, again focused on employment." Posner, Sex Discrimination,supra note 19, at 1311.
379. See supra note 376.
380. See, e.g., Posner, Sex Discrimination, supra note 19, at 1334-35 (arguing that the "overall
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For example, Posner finds it a "plausible hypothesis [that] sex discrimination law has not increased, and it may even have reduced, the aggregate
welfare of women." '' He posits that women are on average rational economic actors who "invest less than men in human capital" (and therefore
reap lower returns on human capital) because a woman "expects to take
more time out of the work force than the average man to raise children."382 Posner grudgingly admits that it "is possible that the greater
propensity of women than men to take time out of the labor force is itself
a product of sex discrimination," but is "skeptical of that proposition" and
thinks that "child-rearing is an area where nature dominates culture,"383
although he provides no evidence to support this sweeping assessment.384
Consequently, Posner excludes historical, social, and political factors from
his analysis.
Talking about gender discrimination without at least taking a peek at
these noneconomic considerations is a bit like Hamlet without the Prince.
Indeed, most discussion of discrimination addresses the noneconomic
aspects of the problem and most of it concludes that women's status and
wealth in society result from a variety of factors other than a hypothetical
free or rational decision to be undereducated, undertrained, unemployed,
and dependent on men." 5 By repeatedly adhering to his famous "tunnel
vision" in economic analysis of a problem,3. 6 Posner gives the impression that he is not very concerned about these other potential causes for
women's lower status. Although Posner the academic has the right to a
narrow and even arid perspective on discrimination, Posner the jurist
should not be afforded this luxury, especially if other parts of the body
politic, such as Congress, have enacted legislation premised on
noneconomic concerns. Decisions like Troupe raise the troubling possibility that Posner cannot resist making his particular brand of economic

effect of the law [may be] to reduce aggregate social welfare because of the allocative and administrative costs").
381. Posner, Sex Discrimination,supra note 19, at 1312.
382. Posner, Sex Discrimination, supra note 19, at 1315. Of course, this opinion contradicts the
congressional view that it is precisely these stereotypical views of women that marginalize them in the
workforce and deny them equal opportunity. See H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4751.
383. Posner, Sex Discrimination,supra note 19, at 1315.
384. See id.
385. See, e.g., Hadfield, supranote 17, at 480-82, 496-99 (providing economic critique of Sex and
Reason and invoking historical, political, sociological, and anthropological factors); Donohue, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination,supra note 19, at 1338-41 (discussing societal attitudes about women in the
workplace). Even examinations of the issue that are primarily economic must acknowledge the presence of historical, social, and psychological factors in determining worker status.
386. See Arthur A. Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L.
REV. 451, 452 (1974) (describing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOcC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1st ed. 1973),
as "four hundred pages of tunnel vision).
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assessment the method for deciding gender discrimination claims, at least
the ones he perceives to be close or unmeritorious, notwithstanding the
sentiment of Congress.
Posner's scholarly writings also revisit an aspect of his work often
seen as troubling by commentators: the uncritical acceptance of empirical
myths, even where countervailing evidence suggests the myths are incorrect. This tendency marred Sex and Reason and was effectively criticized
in several reviews of the work. Particularly good illustrations are the reviews of Gillian Hadfield, which show Posner's analysis of gender roles to
be bound by an antiquated and erroneous sociobiological view of men and
women, 387 and William Eskridge, who notes that Posner, despite a professed objective rigor, falls prey to traditional stereotypes about gays. 8
More recently, Eskridge and Brian Weimer, in reviewing Posner's assessment of the economics of the spread of AIDS, demonstrate beyond argument that Posner's perspective on AIDS ignores a number of real world
factors (e.g., immaturity of the sexually active, rape, fraud, diminished
capacity, miscalculation of costs and benefits) relevant to a truly thorough
analysis (economic or otherwise) of the problem.8 9
In short, where the topic is sex (role, status, or activity), Posner seems
not to have completely disengaged from the ivory tower academic. Even
where Posner faces ugly social facts related to discrimination, he gives
them a sanitized air. "Misogyny ...

is a morally unattractive trait, but

from an economic standpoint it may be no different in character from
having an aversion to cabbage or rutabaga ....

Once in the economic groove, Posner concludes that "there is no
strong theoretical reason to believe that sex discrimination, even if not
prohibited by law, would be a substantial source of inefficiency in American labor markets today."3 9' Consequently, "the costs of administering
that law will be largely a deadweight [economic] loss." 3" Posner ever so
charitably allows that this "does not make the law immoral or unjust" but
argues that this posited loss must be considered in "deciding whether a
particular law or set of laws furthers the public interest.

' 39 3

Although

Posner's provocative views always make interesting reading, it is a little
disconcerting to hear a federal judge, sworn to uphold a statute, damn the
law (which most observers view as public-regarding) with the faint praise

387.
388.
389.
tive, 61
390.
391.
392.
393.

Hadfield, supra note 17, at 480-82, 487-91.
Eskridge, supra note 5, at 359-60.
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Brian D. Weimer, The Economics Epidemic in an AIDS PerspecU. Cm. L. REV. 733, 734-36, 739-49 (1994) (reviewing PMLIPSON & POSNER, supra note 7).
Posner, Sex Discrimination,supra note 19, at 1321.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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39 Posner further concludes,
that perhaps it is not "immoral or unjust.""
with perhaps unrealistic optimism, that sex discrimination is likely to go
away gradually due to market factors."
In his academic writing, Posner's discussion of the black-letter adjudication methodology of Title VII also suggests infirmities in his approach to the Troupe opinion. For example, Posner makes the broad assertion that "[d]isparate impact litigation has been important in eliminating
personnel practices that tended to exclude blacks (i.e., requiring a high
school diploma), but has not been very important in the area of sex discrimination."3" This is probably true, but one reason for the inefficacy
of disparate impact suits is decisions like Gilbert, which refused to see
their applicability to gender issues like pregnancy.398 Similarly, a facially
neutral de facto employment practice such as firing workers on the verge
of a leave might have a disparate impact on women workers who become
temporarily disabled through pregnancy or childbirth.3 Of course,
Troupe's case was never presented as a disparate impact case.' She had
something better, some direct and circumstantial evidence of pregnancy
bias."°t
As to disparate treatment Title VII claims like Troupe's, Posner acknowledges that the "practical difficulties in such litigation are great"'
and that "it often does not pay the plaintiff to invest in the necessary
proof-which involves looking at similarly situated males to show that the
plaintiff's inadequacies were not responsible for her being fired or otherwise mistreated." 3 Despite his awareness of the practical difficulties of
these cases, Posner in Troupe cuts every close inference, and even some
that are not that close, against the plaintiff with the uphill battle.' If

394. Id.
395. See id. at 1321-25.
396. See, e.g., id. at 1328-29.
397. Id. at 1328.
398. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 137-38 (entertaining the idea that plaintiffs could prevail under a
disparate impact theory, but then dismissing this idea, despite the fact that plaintiffs did not attempt to
make out a disparate impact case).
399. Accord Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738 (conceding that disparate impact theory could hypothetically
benefit plaintiff, citing Maganuco v. Leyden Community High Sch. Dist. 212, 939 F.2d 440, 445 (7th
Cir. 1991)).
400. Accord id. (hypothesizing on Troupe's possible disparate impact claim, but failing to rule on
the issue).
401. See supranotes 226-38 and accompanying text. Although, in a revealing glimpse of the hostility of many federal judges to discrimination claims, District Judge Grady refused to even regard
Rauch's comments to Troupe as direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination. See supra notes 142-46
and accompanying text.
402. Posner, Sex Discrimination,supra note 19, at 1328.
403. Id.
404. See, e.g., supra notes 239-49 (fact issue of pretext).
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Posner were seriously concerned about error costs, one might expect him
to take a more charitable view toward plaintiffs because, given Posner's
own analysis of the practicalities of litigation" it will be relatively easy
for clever defendants with good lawyers to avoid liability even when discrimination in fact occurred.
Posner finds the Pregnancy Discrimination Act's ban on disparate
treatment of pregnant employees inefficient because it compels employers
to ignore "a real difference in the average cost of male and female
employees."'
Glancing toward the possibility of unintended consequences, Posner notes that the employer "cannot recoup [the costs of mandated pregnancy benefits] by reducing women's wages... but he can
minimize his costs by employing fewer women." 7 After Troupe, the
employer also can recover his losses by firing women about to take pregnancy leave."° Even though Posner's general economic approach predicts employer efforts to evade the law, in Troupe, Posner paradoxically
gives greater deference to the employer by siding with Lord & Taylor.
Although obviously consistent with his personal views about the inefficiency of sex discrimination laws, Posner's analysis in Troupe nonetheless
contradicts his professed beliefs about statutory interpretation. We will
demonstrate this conflict in the next section.
B. Potential Pitfalls of PosnerianPragmatism:
Troupe as an Example
In the main, we object to Troupe because it fails to follow the basic
groundrules of statutory interpretation Posner has espoused since the mid1980s. Although Posner's methodology of statutory construction has become more eclectic and complex, he has, throughout the past decade,
argued for fidelity to legislative intent and purpose, with judges seeking to
attain case outcomes consistent with the intended effect of the statute.'
He implies this is objectively feasible in the great majority of cases."'
If Posner were loyal to the pragmatic approach proposed in The Problems of Jurisprudence, his methodology in Troupe would be consistent
with his approach to statutory interpretation that has prevailed since the

405. See Posner, Sex Discrimination,supra note 19, at 1328 (discussing uphill battle for disparate
treatment plaintiff).
406. Id. at 1332.
407. Id. at 1333.
408. See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738-39 (holding, as a matter of law, that plaintiff fired for taking a
pregnancy leave cannot prevail in disparate treatment suit without proof that similarly situated male
employee would not be fired for taking a leave of comparable length).
409. See supra notes 68-86 and accompanying text.
410. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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mid-1980s. Although in The Problems of Jurisprudence, Posner suggests
granting greater leeway to courts interpreting statutes, 41' he limits this
judicial discretion to situations where the statutes do not convey a clear
message.4 12 Posner employs the military "command analogy" to explain
his theory.413 He posits that a court faced with interpretation of an unclear statute is like a lieutenant commanding the lead platoon in an attack
who finds the way blocked by an enemy pillbox. 4 4 The lieutenant has
three choices: discontinue the attack; go straight at the pillbox; or try to
bypass it.415 The lieutenant radios to the company's commander for instructions.416 He receives the message, "go" and his radio goes dead.417
Posner concludes that if the lieutenant decides to halt due to the incomplete instructions, he has erred because the portion of the instructions
received clearly suggests intent that the lieutenant take action of some
type.4 8 The difficult question, of course, is what action should be tak41 9
en.
Judges, according to Posner, are often in the position of the lieutenant:
Congress has sent an incomplete or unclear message, but the court cannot
communicate with Congress to find out its intent.'42 Under these circumstances, the "subordinate" (lieutenant or judge) must use creativity and
imagination to solve the problem.42' Instead of interpreting the message,
as in the analogy, the judge needs to complete it.4' This approach differs from the more traditional statutory interpretation approaches, according to Posner, because it is forward-looking. 4 z It requires the judge to
adapt to the future, rather than search only in the past for answers.424
Posner argues, however, that this approach should not be interpreted
as granting judges carte blanche to interpret statutes and constitutional
provisions in order to reach pleasing results. 4' Rather, statutory inter-

411. POsNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 269. As previously noted, Posner in Overcoming

Law does not address statutory construction extensively, but his most recent views are consistent with
The Problems of Jurisprudence.
412. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.

413. See
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.

POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE,

supra note 7, at 269-73.

Id. at 269.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 271.

422. Id.
423. Id. at 269-70.
424. Id. at 270.
425. Id. at 272-73.
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pretation should be creative, rather than mechanical.426 This creative process of "imaginative reconstruction,"427 permits the judges to "summon
all their powers of imagination and empathy, in an effort ...to place
themselves in the position of the legislators who enacted the statute that
they are being asked to interpret. '428 In so doing, judges may not rely on
the plain meaning of the statute only because such analysis is incomplete;
they also need to try to understand the problem faced by the legislators.429 This characterization of the judge's role does not seem particularly radical or even forward-looking as Posner claims.
But Posner acknowledges that imaginative reconstruction can fail:
studying the purpose of the statute often does not help the court reach a
result true to the legislature's intent.43 Furthermore, because gaps or lack
of clarity in a statute often reflect a political deal struck by members of
Congress in order to assure its passage, searching for the purpose or intent
of the legislature in order to answer particular questions raised by the statute may be futile.431
Where imaginative reconstruction fails, Posner advocates studying the
statute to determine whether Congress intended the courts to fill the
gap.432 If courts decide to fill the gap, they must address the question by
"exercising the kind of discretion that a common law court uses to decide
'
a question not ruled by precedent."433
Judges approaching common law
questions without sufficient precedent necessarily resort to a "grab
bag '434 of judicial tools in order to reach the proper result.435 Those
tools include "anecdote, introspection, imagination, common sense, empathy, imputation of motives, speaker's authority, metaphor, analogy, precedent, custom, memory, 'experience,' intuition, and induction (the expectation of regularities, a disposition related both to intuition and to analogy). 436
If Posner had followed his own theoretical construct, Troupe probably
would have reached a different result. The message from Congress regarding the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was not incomplete nor was its
purpose indeterminate. 437 The Act specifically reversed a Supreme Court

426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.

See id. at 270-71.
Id. at 273.
Id.
See id. at 267-74.
See id. at 273-76.
Id. at 276-77.
See id. at 278.
Id. at 279.
See id. at 273 (practical reason resorts to "grab bag" of ways of deciding an issue).
See id. at 279.
Id.at 73.
See supra notes 307-28 and accompanying text.
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case that Congress regarded as erroneous to expressly forbid any job discrimination based on pregnancy just as the law forbade race, religion, and

national origin discrimination.43 In making this declaration, Congress
did not sluff a controversial political issue onto a less visible administra-

tive or judicial arm of government. Instead, Congress made a stirring
declaration in favor of the rights of women workers.
Viewed in fair totality,439 the Act comes very close to Posner's model of the type of statute that gives quite explicit interpretative commands
to judges.' A command of this sort from Congress suggests that a
judge truly giving appropriate deference to legislative intent and purpose

would make all reasonable inferences of legal and factual interpretation in
favor of the woman alleging pregnancy discrimination. Likewise, he seems
oblivious to the thrust of the statute. Rather than willingly carrying forward the congressional mandate, Posner acts in Troupe as if he were construing a narrow statute intended by Congress to have only the most limited application."
Moreover, there was binding precedent from the Supreme Court establishing summary judgment law and the methods and burdens of proof in
Title VII cases that Posner and his colleagues ignored. 2 Given these
strong directives from Congress and caselaw, Posner need not resort to
any "imaginative reconstruction" of how legislatures might want Troupe's
case adjudicated nor need he sample from the judicial grab bag of intuitive, policy-soaked reflections that can so easily lead to substituting personal preference for settled law.
One consequently wonders why Posner in Troupe did not simply

438. See supra notes 307-28 and accompanying text. Both Posner and the Supreme Court have
acknowledged that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act did more than overrule Gilbert. See Troupe, 20
F.3d at 735 (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678
(1983)).
439. See supra notes 285-328 and accompanying text (discussing legislative background of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act).
440. See supra text accompanying note 81.
441. On the issue of summary judgment, Posner also tends to display favoritism for the common
law views of judges (at least the more conservative judges of the Seventh Circuit) rather than the
policy views of the legislature. The overly aggressive use of summary judgment, particularly in discrimination cases, grows out of some rhetoric in the Supreme Court's 1986 summary judgment trilogy
and its misuse in many circuit and district courts. See McGinley, supra note 205, at 206-42. These
judicial misperceptions and misapplications of summary judgment conflict with the actual text of Rule
56 as tacitly approved by Congress in adopting the rule pursuant to federal statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 20712077 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See Stempel, supra note 249, at 129-56. Finally, it is inconsistent with
the solicitude Congress has shown toward job discrimination and civil rights claims in enacting the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 and other legislation overturning crabbed judicial interpretations of civil
rights statutes. See Stempel, supra note 338, at 657-59 (summarizing congressional efforts at overruling of Supreme Court decisions adverse to civil rights claimants during 1976-1990 period).
442. See supra part Ill.A.
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follow the teachings of his command analogy and give appropriate deference to congressional purpose and the practical epistemological difficulties of assessing the "true" facts of the case (i.e., was Troupe discharged
because she was tardy, about to take a medical leave, or because she was
pregnant?). Was Troupe the result of isolated error, political partisanship,
or a more systematic failing of Posner's professed pragmatism? We think
the tragedy of Troupe"3 stems both from Posner's falling short of his
own theoretical aspirations of the judicial function" and from inherent
flaws in his pragmatist construct." 5
Once a case is classified as sufficiently indeterminate according to the
standard indices of statutory meaning, Posner's pragmatism vests the judge
with a great deal of interpretative authority to seek the "best result."' It
permits judges substantial freedom to invoke intuition and personal assessment when deciding cases. Although Posner has criticized such grants
of judicial authority as the trick of political liberals seeking to obtain substantive policy victories from courts that they could not obtain in the electoral process," 7 conservative judges armed with his pragmatist arsenal
are just as capable of using the judicial power to defeat the policy gains
attained by liberals in the legislature.'

443. "Tragedy" is, of course, a melodramatic word. However, one need not be overly emotive in
resisting law's call for sterilized prose and analysis to rightly regard the decision as tragic. An individual litigant was at least treated unfairly and perhaps discriminated against by an employer. See Troupe,
20 F.3d at 735-36; supra notes 107-17 and accompanying text. She was then accorded unsympathetic,
unfavorable treatment by the federal judiciary at both the trial and appellate level. See supra notes
120-21 and accompanying text. The decision sets a precedent designed to make it more difficult for
disempowered victims of discrimination, particularly those with low dollar-value claims, to attain
corrective justice. But Posner wrongfully characterizes discrimination legislation as an attempt to
achieve distributive justice. See Posner, A Primer, supra note 6, at 439. Finally, the judiciary pruned
back hard-won rights conferred by the legislative branch authorized to determine statutory rights.
"Tragedy" is the right word.
444. See supra notes 68-90 and accompanying text (summarizing Posner's recent jurisprudential
writings).
445. If, however, one takes the cynical view that Posner is engaged in a covert enterprise to advance his personal political preferences through decisions cast in the language of reasonable, objective,
and principled legal discourse, then Troupe is a brilliant opinion in that it does significant damage to
pregnancy discrimination law but will be convincing to many readers. We have conducted our review
of Posner's writings and the Troupe opinion on the assumption that Posner is not engaged in cynical
manipulation and actually believes what he says.
446. Accord supra notes 411-12 and accompanying text (discussing POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE,
supra note 7, on the leeway of courts to interpret statutes).
447. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 269-73.
448. See Redish & Chung, supra note 51, at 857-58. The Supreme Court of the Burger-Rehnquist
era has been criticized for this sort of partisanship. E.g., Stempel, supra note 338, at 645-62; see also
Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 59 (1989) (suggesting that the conservative Court in the 1988 term used whatever justification was necessary to
achieve preferred outcomes); D. Marvin Jones, Unrightable Wrongs: The Rehnquist Court, Civil
Rights, and an Elegy for Dreams, 25 U. SAN FRAN. L. REV. 1, 10-16 (1990) (criticizing the Rehnquist
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Indeed, in Troupe, Posner may have used his pragmatism as a
smokescreen, either conscious or subconscious, for his antipathy toward
discrimination suits. 9 In so doing, he violates his own tenets. When
pragmatism is used to liberate the judge from the constraints of more
conventional indicia of statutory interpretation such as text, intent, and
purpose, the judge can draw from the pragmatist's grab bag the tools with
which she is most conversant or comfortable (in both an experiential and a
political sense). Not surprisingly, when adjudicating, Posner, the entrepreneur of the law and economics movement,45 tends to prefer economic
analysis to the application of other factors that might help illuminate the
correct, most reasonable, fairest, or most socially useful result. Although
Posner employs no graphs and avoids the buzz words characteristic of
economics scholarship, his Troupe opinion is evidently a product of reverence for the free market of at-will employment, employer prerogatives,
wealth-maximization and of economics-based distaste for
antidiscrimination law.
Another potential flaw in Posner's theory of adjudication may stem
from his concept of principled decisionmaking and judicial restraint. His
views on the subject, although invariably interesting, are oddly on the border of the mainstream and, in our view, wrong. In a 1983 article45' reprised in a chapter of The Federal Courts,"2 Posner purports to define
the frequently invoked terms "principled," "result-oriented," "judicial
activism," and "judicial self-restraint."4 3 To Posner, a result-oriented decision is one made "according to personal or partisan considerations gener4 4 But Posner's notion of illegitimacy is
ally agreed to be illegitimate.""
not particularly Victorian. To Posner, a decision is "principled" rather than
result-oriented if "the ground of decision can be stated truthfully in a form
the judge could avow without inviting universal condemnation by profes-

Court for abandoning notions of judicial restraint to rewrite the law with a conservative slant). Nevertheless, the Court's Reagan conservatives have usually pursued policy preferences through a formalist
textualism, invoking favorable linguistic interpretation under the guise of plain meaning and submerging value choices. See Stephen F. Ross, Reaganist Realism Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV.
399, 422-28, 428-33. Posner's pragmatism, to its credit, is more open about the policymaking inherent
in adjudication. See supranotes 87-90 and accompanying text. However, like the other preferred methodologies of liberals and conservatives, Posner's pragmatism presents plenty of opportunity for sub-

terfuge.
449. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text (discussing Posner's distaste for such suits).

450. Posner is, after all, the sole author of Economic Analysis of Law, now in its fourth edition.
See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIs, 4th, supra note 7.
451. Richard A. Posner, The Meaning of JudicialSelf-Restraint, 59 IND. L. 1 (1983).
452. See POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 7, at 198-221 (discussing judicial restraint in

chapter 7).
453. Posner, supra note 451, at 1-2.

454. Id. at 8.
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sional opinion."455 Unprincipled or result-oriented decisions are those
whose real basis is "so generally rejected that they would never be an' As part of these definitions,
nounced as the true grounds of decision."456
Posner assumes that in acceptable opinions, even if predictably adverse to
some litigants and helpful to others, the judge can base the decision on a
principle (e.g., wealth maximization or wealth redistribution) rather than
on an attitude (e.g., dislike of unions, friendship with corporate CEOs), the
decision is "principled" and not "result-oriented."457
In other words, as long as a candid judge would not be ridiculed while
discussing a case, the decision is legitimate. By implication, however,
Posner's lexicon grants judges a license to legislate. As Posner emphasizes
458 and appreciated at the time of The
in The Problems of Jurisprudence
459
Federal Courts, law is a diverse discipline with a wide range of legitimate viewpoints. As Posner pithily notes, the consensus of the Harvard
Legal Process school "forged by the end of the 1950s now lies in ruins."' Today, Posner observes, the degree of indeterminacy in law is so
great that no one is even mildly shocked when losing litigants or professors label a Supreme Court decision as incorrect.4 6' Legal doctrines and
viewpoints are highly contingent, capable of varying in rapid phases.462
Under these circumstances, defining principle and nonpartisanship as
the absence of universal opprobrium by the legal profession is a bit like
saying a decision is correct so long as the citizenry does not riot in the
streets. By Posner's reckoning, decisions are principled and nonpartisan
even when greeted with overwhelming criticism (which is, by definition,
something less than universal condemnation). Conversely, decisions endorsed or accepted by the legal establishment would seem not to be capable of being unprincipled or result-oriented. Imagine applying this yardstick to the Nazi laws.
As Posner acknowledges, by his definition calling a decision
"'principled' is at best a tepid compliment."463 Posner rightly notes that
being principled is not enough-the judge must be employing the right
principles, or at least acceptable principles. "The terms of the statute he is
applying, or precedent, or other sources of authoritative guidance to judicial decision-making may dictate that a particular principle be applied in a

455. Id.
456. Id.
457. See id. at 8-9.
458. See POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 128-29.

459.
460.
461.
462.
463.

See POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 7, at 262.
Posner, A Primer,supra note 6, at 434.
See POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 80.
Id.
Posner, supra note 451, at 9.
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particular case."' Yet, reading Posner's scholarly work and Troupe, one
gets the uneasy feeling that judges have more freedom to pick and choose
principles than one might prefer. Troupe is just one example where Posner
has opted for wealth maximization and the prerogatives of employers even
in the face of powerful evidence that these are not the principles Congress
sought to promote.
Posner's political conservatism also is reflected in his definition of
what constitutes judicial self-restraint. According to Posner, the term can
reasonably have any one of five different meanings.' He states that his
and the legal system's principal connotation of the term is a judicial desire
"to reduce the power of [the] court system relative to that of other branches of government."' He also suggests, however, that one connotation of
the term which interests him is judicial decision "influenced by a concern
lest promiscuous judicial creation of rights result in so swamping the
'
courts in litigation that they cannot function effectively."467
As discussed in Part II, Posner's Troupe decision does just the opposite of reducing judicial power in deference to legislative and executive
power. Rather, it enhances judicial power by limiting the reach of a congressional enactment. At a minimum, Posner is being unfaithful to his
professed fidelity to at least this definition of restraintist judging.
Similarly, Posner in Troupe appears to be at odds with other definitions of restraint. 8 But without doubt, Posner in Troupe has remained
true to the definition of judicial restraint that reflects a desire to limit the
business of the federal courts. Although this concept of restraint may be
apt in the common law context, we find it jarringly inapt for statutory
interpretation. The point of the statute may in fact be a legislative command that courts become more involved in some aspect of American life.
Troupe was not asking the court to create a right, promiscuously or other-

464. Id.
465. Id. at 10.

466. Id.
467. Id.; see id. at 11. In another discrimination case, Posner candidly acknowledged that pressure

to trim the docket might well work against claimants. See Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398 (7th
Cir. 1990). According to Posner, appellate judges are extremely reluctant to overrule grants of summary judgment by trial courts "merely because a rational factfinder could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party, if such a verdict is highly unlikely as a practical matter." Id. at 403. This approach
is logically faulty and unfair to claimants of all types, but may weigh particularly heavily on discrimination plaintiffs. See McGinley, supra note 205, at 206-09.
The other Posnerian definitions of judicial restraint are:
(I) Keeping the judge's own policy preferences from influencing his decisions;
(2) Being cautious about intruding policy views [in the adjudication process];
(3) Being aware of "practical political constraints on the exercise of judicial power."
Posner, supra note 451, at 10.
468. See supranote 467.
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wise. She simply wanted a trial determination about a right she already
possessed by virtue of congressional enactment and signature by the President. When the bench thwarts such a claim, this can hardly be justified in
the name of judicial restraint.
Posner thus emerges as a theorist whose concept of judicial restraint
may not involve the traditional concept of the term (i.e., deference to the
other branches or detached decisionmaking) so much as it seeks limitations on claims and court authority, at least court authority in the service
of individual rights, particularly rights of recent vintage. 9 In short,
Troupe suggests that Posner's pragmatism is indeed vulnerable to becoming simply a fluid jurisprudential philosophy enabling the judge to exer47 in the service of personal preferences. As
cise "power without guilt""
one reviewer put it, "Posner springs into his antifoundationalism without
any of the sense of humility that comes from understanding why foundations are attractive."47 ' Indeed, foundations serve to regulate the personal
agendas of a legal profession and American body politic with frequently
conflicting views. Although pragmatism can and should be more regarded
as constrained by the social and legal landscape (even in hard cases),
Troupe suggests Posner's pragmatism may lack sufficient boundaries.
V. CONCLUSION: JUDGING THE JUDGE BY HIS WORK

In Troupe, a badly treated claimant 72 was not only turned away
from vindication of a statutory legal right but also was used as a human
pawn in a clever judge's larger game of shaping the law to fit his personal
views regarding the merit of pregnancy discrimination claims-even
though this personal aversion to these claims occasionally belies his frequent public pronouncements of fidelity to the legislature and the essentially neutral and constrained role of the judge. In the process, the claimant was subtly ridiculed and labeled as unworthy of legal assistance. Furthermore, future litigants face a precedent that makes it likely that they,

469. See supra note 467.
470. See Jonathan Simon, Power Without Guilt, 56 REV. POL. 465, 467 (1991) ("While some
pragmatists, Richard Rorty in particular, find in epistemological and ontological skepticism an imperative to develop a sense of contingency in one's thought and solidarity with others, Richard Posner
finds a license to exercise power without guilt. Of course Posner would encourage judges to adhere to
constraining practices, and above all reasonableness, and his descriptions of the world are apt to seem
reasonable to the other white, male, and affluent denizens of our high courts and academies.").
471. Id. at 466-67; accord Robert S. Summers, Judge Richard Posner's Jurisprudence, 89 MICH.
L. REV. 1302, 1324 (1991) (resolving that Posner "does not give the argument from ordinary meaning
[of statutes] its just due"). Summers feels that generally Posner understates the value of formal rules.
See id. at 1312-25.
472. Troupe was badly treated by any reasonable definition despite the digs taken at her by
Posner. Whatever her problems of tardiness, the Lord & Taylor store management could have done
better than working her up to the point of pregnancy leave and then firing her as the leave arrived.
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too, will not realize congressionally and constitutionally conferred rights
unless a federal judge (often of different race and gender) finds them
sufficiently worthy to plead their case before their peers.
473 It is not even GilTo be sure, Troupe is not Plessy v. Ferguson.
474
bert v. General Electric. But Troupe shares the same undistinguished
lineage and works the same pernicious sort of mischief. Even the most
prominent and respected judges of our system deserve criticism when they
produce opinions like Troupe.
In addition, Troupe serves as a gauge for assessing the intellectual

travels of its famous author. One could read Posner's recent works, The
475 and Cardozo: A Study in Reputation, 6
Problems of Jurisprudence,
as placing him in the illustrious mainstream of reflective jurists within a
few degrees left or right of moderation. Posner has sought to claim the
mantle of the eclectic centrist tradition of Holmes,4' Brandeis, Cardozo,
and Hand. Troupe is a figurative splash of cold water, a reality check of
the evolving Posnerian philosophy. The Posner of Troupe bears closer
resemblance to the Justice Rehnquist of Gilbert than to these historical
titans of the law. According to the standard Posner himself articulated in
his examination of Cardozo (quoted at the outset of this article), Posner's
work in Troupe fell short of his aspirations.

473. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Plessy held, of course, that state statutes mandating segregated, "separate but equal" traveling accommodations are consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 54452.
474. 429 U.S. at 125; see supra notes 283-306 and accompanying text.
475. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7.
476. POSNER, supra note 1.
477. Posner wraps this cloak about himself in his introduction to his recent book on Holmes. See
POSNER, ed., ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 7, at xv-xvii. He has been quite successful in persuading
much of the legal community of the resemblance. See, e.g., Donohue, ProhibitingSex Discrimination,
supra note 19, at 1367-68 (despite his skepticism about discrimination laws, Posner has "evident solicitude for the rights of plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases [that] is evocative of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes's desire to faithfully interpret the Sherman Antitrust Act, of which he was always
highly dubious").
Although perhaps gushing a bit, Donohue is not incorrect. Our review of Posner's other discrimination opinions suggests that he generally keeps his opposition to Title VII in check. See id. at
1367-68 & n.83. Troupe thus stands in even starker contrast as a substandard Posner opinion. We also
note in passing that in the case cited by Donohue as evidence of the Holmesian Posner, see id. at 1367
(quoting Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697-98 (7th Cir. 1987)), Posner is again overstressing
the importance of worker comparison data in discrimination claims. See Riordan, 831 F.2d at 700.
Donohue also may be excessive in his praise of Holmes's antitrust jurisprudence. See Spencer W.
Waller, The Antitrust Philosophy of Justice Holmes, 18 So. ILL. U. LJ. 283, 327 (1994) (concluding
that personal biases indeed affected Holmes's antitrust opinions).
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